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## Off

Republican opposition to a debt ceiling compromise is dying down and Obama’s push is successful

Beamon, 9/18

Todd Beamon, news reporter for Newsmax; “House GOP Charge Senators with Caving on Push to Defund Obamacare,” 9/18/2013, http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/house-gop-obamacare-caving/2013/09/18/id/526535 //bghs-ms

Republicans in the House of Representatives are accusing their colleagues in the Senate for what they see as an abrupt concession in the push to defund Obamacare. “They're waving the white flag already," one House GOP lawmaker told Fox News on Wednesday. The unusually caustic intra-party struggle began earlier in the day after House Speaker John Boehner said he would agree to the demands of legislators backed by the tea party to tie a vote on defunding the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act to a vote on a resolution to fund the federal government beginning Oct. 1. The move would effectively condition the approval of the spending bill on Obamacare being defunded, or else risk a government shutdown when funding runs out at the end of the month, Fox reports. Boehner set the vote for Friday. But then, Sen. Ted Cruz, the Texas Republican who has been pushing hard to defund Obamacare, stunned his House colleagues by releasing a statement Wednesday afternoon that appeared to acknowledge that the bill would probably fail in the Senate. “Today's announcement that the House will vote to defund Obamacare is terrific news,” Cruz said, in a news release from him and GOP Sens. Marco Rubio of Florida and Mike Lee of Utah. “Harry Reid will no doubt try to strip the defund language from the continuing resolution — and right now he likely has the votes to do so," the release said. "At that point, House Republicans must stand firm, hold their ground, and continue to listen to the American people.” But Texas GOP Rep. Blake Farenthold urged Cruz not to be so decisive so quickly. “As I work with my fellow House Republicans on a continuing resolution that funds the government and permanently defunds Obamacare, I look forward to working with Sen. Ted Cruz on winning enough votes in the Senate to defund the Unaffordable Care Act," Farenthold said in a statement. "I urge the senator not to give up before the bill even reaches the Senate.” Still, House Republicans are concerned that Cruz's move essentially pins the entire effort on the House, according to Fox. "We expect them to stand and filibuster like Rand Paul," one senior House GOP aide told Fox. "It's time to put on the big-boy pants," one House Republican, who asked not to be identified, told Fox. "Maybe this will wean us of the bed-wetters." A senior GOP leadership aide told Fox that they do not expect this dissension to cause the bill to fail in the House on Friday. They are concerned, however, about where things are going now if the GOP senators don't defend their turf. Effectively, in announcing the new bill, Boehner and his deputies backed off a compromise approach they earlier tried to sell to conservative legislators within the ranks, Fox reports. That plan called for the House to send two bills to the Senate: one to defund Obamacare, the other to finance the government. The Senate, then, could easily bypass the Obamacare bill and send the spending resolution to the White House, thus averting a government shutdown. But House conservatives revolted, and Boehner is now linking the votes. The plan, clearly, is risky, Fox reports. Both President Barack Obama and Senate Democratic Leader Harry Reid of Nevada have hinted that Republicans would be blamed if the government ended up shutting down. Obama blasted Republicans in an interview on Tuesday with the Spanish-language Telemundo Network.

TPP negotiations require Obama to expend political capital

Gantz 5/20 – University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law, for ITA, Japan’s Entry into the TPP Negotiations Raises the Economic Stakes, 20 MAY 2013, <http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2013/05/20/japans-entry-into-the-tpp-negotiations-raises-the-economic-stakes/>)

The only alternative would be for the Obama Administration to accelerate the negotiations by scheduling additional sessions during the next 6-8 months, a step which it was apparently not contemplating even before the plethora of recent domestic crises erupted.¶ ¶ With the inclusion of Japan both the rewards of success and the risks of failure for the United States have escalated. The potential trade and other economic benefits of a free trade agreement encompassing 12 nations with an aggregate GDP of in excess of $26 trillion are staggering. It might also convince some of the more recalcitrant WTO Members (e.g., Brazil, China, India and South Africa) to become more serious about salvaging some elements of the defunct Doha Development Round in Geneva and in any event is likely to encourage additional TPP participation in the Pacific Rim, likely including Costa Rica, Korea and Thailand.¶ ¶ Conversely, a failure to close the deal would do severe damage to United States’ economic, political and security interests in Asia, at a level far beyond the failure of the Free Trade Area of the Americas in the Western Hemisphere a decade ago. Among consequences would almost certainly be an acceleration of the RCEP negotiations and other regional trade initiatives in Asiathat include China but exclude the United States, and the reluctant conclusion on the part of many Asian nations, possibly including Japan, that the United States is not really serious about reinforcing its economic presence in the region. This suggests that serious efforts to reach a successful conclusion to the negotiations must continue, even if the United States is required to make more compromises than it has in earlier FTAs, even if another year or more is required for conclusion of the negotiations and even if President Obama is required to expend significant political capital to assure the negotiations reach a successful conclusion and the agreement is approved by Congress. Whether the United States has both the negotiating skills and the political will, and whether the other Parties are willing to cooperate to bring the negotiations to a successful end, remains to be determined.

It crowds out Obama’s agenda

Moore, 9/10 – finance and economics editor for the Guardian (Heidi, “Syria: the great distraction, Obama is focused on a conflict abroad, but the fight he should be gearing up for is with Congress on America's economic security,” 9/10/2013, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/10/obama-syria-what-about-sequester)

The country will crash into the debt ceiling in mid-October, which would be an economic disaster, especially with a government shutdown looming at the same time. These are deadlines that Congress already learned two years ago not to toy with, but memories appear to be preciously short. The Federal Reserve needs a new chief in three months, someone who will help the country confront its raging unemployment crisis that has left 12 million people without jobs. The president has promised to choose a warm body within the next three weeks, despite the fact that his top pick, Larry Summers, would likely spark an ugly confirmation battle – the "fight of the century," according to some – with a Congress already unwilling to do the President's bidding. Congress was supposed to pass a farm bill this summer, but declined to do so even though the task is already two years late. As a result, the country has no farm bill, leaving agricultural subsidies up in the air, farmers uncertain about what their financial picture looks like, and a potential food crisis on the horizon. The two main housing agencies, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, have been in limbo for four years and are desperately in need of reform that should start this fall, but there is scant attention to the problem. These are the problems going unattended by the Obama administration while his aides and cabinet members have been wasting the nation's time making the rounds on television and Capitol Hill stumping for a profoundly unpopular war. The fact that all this chest-beating was for naught, and an easy solution seems on the horizon, belies the single-minded intensity that the Obama White House brought to its insistence on bombing Syria. More than one wag has suggested, with the utmost reason, that if Obama had brought this kind of passion to domestic initiatives, the country would be in better condition right now. As it is, public policy is embarrassingly in shambles at home while the administration throws all of its resources and political capital behind a widely hated plan to get involved in a civil war overseas. The upshot for the president may be that it's easier to wage war with a foreign power than go head-to-head with the US Congress, even as America suffers from neglect. This is the paradox that President Obama is facing this fall, as he appears to turn his back on a number of crucial and urgent domestic initiatives in order to spend all of his meager political capital on striking Syria. Syria does present a significant humanitarian crisis, which has been true for the past two years that the Obama administration has completely ignored the atrocities of Bashar al-Assad. Two years is also roughly the same amount of time that key domestic initiatives have also gone ignored as Obama and Congress engage in petty battles for dominance and leave the country to run itself on a starvation diet imposed by sequestration cuts. Leon Panetta tells the story of how he tried to lobby against sequestration only to be told: Leon, you don't understand. The Congress is resigned to failure. Similarly, those on Wall Street, the Federal Reserve, those working at government agencies, and voters themselves have become all too practiced at ignoring the determined incompetence of those in Washington. Political capital – the ability to horse-trade and win political favors from a receptive audience – is a finite resource in Washington. Pursuing misguided policies takes up time, but it also eats up credibility in asking for the next favor. It's fair to say that congressional Republicans, particularly in the House, have no love for Obama and are likely to oppose anything he supports. That's exactly the reason the White House should stop proposing policies as if it is scattering buckshot and focus with intensity on the domestic tasks it wants to accomplish, one at a time.

Obama’s failure to force a compromise would destroy the economy – empirics prove – turns the case

Lobello, 8/27

Carmel Lobello, the business editor at TheWeek.com; “How the looming debt ceiling fight could screw up the U.S. economy,” 8/27/2013, http://theweek.com/article/index/248775/how-the-looming-debt-ceiling-fight-could-screw-up-the-us-economy //bghs-ms

The sooner-than-expected deadline comes at an inconvenient moment, because Congress is already facing a budget deadline for the stopgap "continuing resolution" that finances the federal government, which is set to run out September 30. Failure to come to an agreement would trigger a government shutdown. Having two big deadlines fall two weeks apart could be a recipe for disaster. Republicans, led by Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio), have been musing about the possibility of using the debt ceiling, instead of a government shutdown, as leverage to delay the implementation of ObamaCare. But as Ezra Klein put it in The Washington Post, "Trading a government shutdown for a debt-ceiling breach is like trading the flu for septic shock": Anything Republicans might fear about a government shutdown is far more terrifying amidst a debt-ceiling breach. The former is an inconvenience. The latter is a global financial crisis. It’s the difference between what happened in 1995, when the government did shutdown, and what happened in 2008, when global markets realized a bedrock investment they thought was safe (housing in that case, U.S. treasuries in this one) was full of risk. [The Washington Post] Indeed, a debt ceiling debate in 2011 that went on to the last possible minute had real economic consequences, leading Standard & Poor's to downgrade the United States' credit rating. The move "left a clear and deep dent in US economic and market data," said Matt Phillips at Quartz. Investors pulled huge amounts of cash from the stock market, and consumer confidence was hurt as well. When the same problem cropped up again in May 2012, because Congress failed to reach a long-term deal, Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolfers in Bloomberg explained how confidence plummeted the first time around: [Confidence] went into freefall as the political stalemate worsened through July. Over the entire episode, confidence declined more than it did following the collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. in 2008. After July 31, when the deal to break the impasse was announced, consumer confidence stabilized and began a long, slow climb that brought it back to its starting point almost a year later. [Bloomberg] This morning, Wolfers had this to say: Treasury Secretary Jack Lew visited CNBC Tuesday morning to reiterate President Obama's promise not to go down he same road. "The president has made it clear: We're not going to negotiate over the debt limit," Lew said. He also explained why in a letter to Boehner Monday morning. "Protecting the full faith and credit of the United States is the responsibility of Congress, because only Congress can extend the nation's borrowing authority," he wrote. "Failure to meet that responsibility would cause irreparable harm to the American economy." But Boehner is facing intense pressure from the right wing of his caucus to extract concessions from Obama before raising the debt limit, concessions that many view as extreme. With his speakership on the line, Boehner says he has no intention of backing down, responding, "I’ve made it clear that we’re not going to increase the debt limit without cuts and reforms that are greater than the increase in the debt limit." “The president doesn’t think this is fair, thinks I’m being difficult to deal with," he said. "But I’ll say this: It may be unfair but what I’m trying to do here is to leverage the political process to produce more change than what it would produce if left to its own devices. We’re going to have a whale of a fight."

## Off

A. Interpretation – “economic engagement” means the aff must be an exclusively economic action – it cannot encompass broader forms of engagement

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The approach to engagement as economic engagement focuses exclusively on economic instruments of foreign policy with the main national interest being security. Economic engagement is a policy of the conscious development of economic relations with the adversary in order to change the target state‟s behaviour and to improve bilateral relations

That means trade and aid in the form of loans or grants – diplomatic engagement is distinct

Resnick, 1 – Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University (Evan, Journal of International Affairs, “Defining Engagement” Vol. 54 No. 2, Political Science Complete)

A REFINED DEFINITION OF ENGAGEMENT

In order to establish a more effective framework for dealing with unsavory regimes, I propose that we define engagement as the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through the comprehensive establishment and enhancement of contacts with that state across multiple issue-areas (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, cultural). The following is a brief list of the specific forms that such contacts might include:

DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS

Extension of diplomatic recognition; normalization of diplomatic relations

Promotion of target-state membership in international institutions and regimes

Summit meetings and other visits by the head of state and other senior government officials of sender state to target state and vice-versa

MILITARY CONTACTS

Visits of senior military officials of the sender state to the target state and vice-versa

Arms transfers

Military aid and cooperation

Military exchange and training programs

Confidence and security-building measures

Intelligence sharing

ECONOMIC CONTACTS

Trade agreements and promotion

Foreign economic and humanitarian aid in the form of loans and/or grants

CULTURAL CONTACTS

Cultural treaties

Inauguration of travel and tourism links

Sport, artistic and academic exchanges(n25)

B. Violation – the affirmative is diplomatic engagement

Azel, 9 (Jose Azel, Information and Analysis from the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies University of Miami, “In Defense of “Carrots and Sticks””, <http://www6.miami.edu/iccas/Docs/Cuba_Brief.pdf>, April 6, 2009, 6/28/13, CW]

Diplomatic engagement with an adversary rarely, if ever, succeeds by merely appealing ¶ to the adversary’s higher principles. It is an implausible strategy with the likes of Ahmadinejad, ¶ Kim Jong-il, or Castro, where the vigorous interaction of values and diplomacy are necessary. ¶ By definition, diplomacy and diplomatic engagement are about negotiations to find mutually ¶ acceptable solutions to a common challenge. Giving away all U.S. bargaining positions in return ¶ for nothing is not a mutually acceptable solution. In negotiations, when an unconditional ¶ concession is given, the other party pockets it and moves on to its next demand. That is precisely ¶ what the Castro government would do with the recommended giveaways. In the real world, if ¶ one arrives at the negotiating table empty handed, one is sure to leave empty handed.

## Off

Neoliberalism is dying in Latin America – we should resist attempts at triage that promote deregulation and unrestrained pursuit of profit like the affirmative

Pineo, 13 – Senior Research Fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, and Professor and Chair of the Department of History at Towson University (Ron, Posted on April 11, 2012- See more at: http://www.coha.org/22227/#sthash.L5CsywQs.dpuf )

Poverty in Latin America has been reduced substantially in the last three decades. In the late 1980s, nearly half of Latin America’s population lived in poverty. Today the fraction is about a third. [21] This marks important progress, and it has continued in some area nations. However, it is worth noting that between 2002 and 2008, poverty contracted most in Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Argentina, countries which had largely **abandoned neoliberalism**; in Brazil, which had at least partially rejected neoliberalism; and in only two other states, Honduras and Perú, which still remained, at least partially, committed to free market polices. [22] It was mostly factors **beyond economic policy** that helps to account for recent declines in the rate of Latin American poverty. One factor was increasing remittances from Latin Americans laboring in the developed world, especially in the United States. Total remittances from Latin American workers rose from $12 billion USD in 1995, to $45 billion in 2004, and $68 billion in 2006. [23] However, “by far the main contributor to the reduction in the poverty rate,” as Jaime Ros has noted, was “the fall in the dependency ratio.” [24] The indicator measures the number of non-working age people—children and the elderly—who are supported by the working age population. The higher the dependency number, the greater the economic burden. Source: foreignpolicyblogs.com Latin America’s past demographic history underlies this shift in the dependency ratio. The late 1940s in Latin America witnessed lower overall death rates (the number of people who died a year divided by the total population), especially due to lower infant and childhood mortality rates. Initially, birth rates stayed high even as death rates fell, but after a generation passed Latin America’s birth rates began to drift downward to match the lower death rates. The time gap between the fall in death rates beginning in the late 1940s and the eventual fall in birth rates by the late 1970s resulted in an unprecedented population explosion. Latin America’s population rose from 167 million in 1950 to 285 million by 1970. As this population cohort has aged, Latin America’s dependency ratio fell too, dropping from a very high rate of 87.3 in the years 1965-1970, to 55.0 for 2005-2010, an all-time low for the region. The people born during the population explosion are of working age now, bringing the region a historic but one-time economic advantage, the “demographic bonus” or “demographic dividend.” As a result, Latin America temporarily enjoys a situation of a very large number of workers providing for a greatly reduced number of dependent people. The region’s demographic bonus means that there is, for the moment, less poverty due, in large part, to the increased number of working age people per household. [25] A drop in the dependency ratio carries with it greater female participation in the workforce, for lower fertility means there are fewer children to care for, freeing women to enter the paid workforce. Lower fertility also means better overall lifetime health for women, resulting in more years spent in the paid workforce for adult females. The fertility rate (the number of children born per woman per year) fell in Latin America from 5.6 for the years from 1965 to1970, to 2.4 for the years 2005 to 2010. The resulting demographic bonus has provided a significant, but fleeting, economic asset. By 2025, as the current population ages, Latin America will need to support a very large elderly dependent population. [26] It is fair to conclude that the reduction of poverty in Latin America in recent years was produced mainly by some short-term victories in the commodity lottery (as explained in Part I, the commodity lottery refers to short-term price rises for selected raw material exports), as well as a spike in remittances, and most of all, a one-time reduction in the dependency ratio. Income inequality data for Latin America is less positive. In the 1980s and 1990s, inequality increased significantly in Latin America. For example, from 1984 to 1994, the income of the top 10 percent of the Mexico’s population rose by 21 percent, while the income of the country’s bottom 10 percent fell by 23 percent. Nevertheless, there have been improvements, albeit modest ones, in lowering the Gini coefficient (a measure of economic inequality with 0 being the least inequality—everyone has the same income, and 1.0 being the most inequality—one person has all the income). Source: norlarnet.uio.no From 2002 to 2008, the Gini coefficient improved in seven Latin American states; five of these seven countries—Venezuela, Argentina, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Paraguay—have traveled the farthest in rejecting neoliberalism. Outside of these nations inequality stayed the same or even increased, including in the largely neoliberal states of Colombia, the Dominican Republic, and Guatemala. In 1970, the richest 1 percent of Latin Americans earned 363 times more than the poorest 1 percent. By 1995, it was 417 times more. Latin America continues to show, by far, the greatest income inequality of any region in the world. Of the 15 most unequal economies in the world today, 10 are in the area. If Latin America’s income were only as unevenly distributed as that of Eastern Europe or South Asia, its recent economic growth, though sometimes anemic, would have reduced the percentage of those living in poverty to 3 percent of the population. [27] The Economist, in its 2010 review of the Latin American economic situation, concluded that the region was “well on the way to building middle-class societies.” [28] The evidence, however, contradicts this assertion. The informal sector—where people arrange irregular employment in itinerant retail sales, as day workers, or other loosely arranged jobs—today accounts for more than half of all workers in Latin America. More than eight of ten new jobs in Latin America are in the informal sector. [29] Informal sector workers enjoy no protective regulation or benefits. They live by their wits, striving to scratch out a living, day by day. Meanwhile, union membership among active workers in Latin America fell from around one-fourth in the 1980s to under one-sixth in the 1990s. Source: laht.com Moreover, significant areas of severe poverty remain in Latin America, expressed along class, racial, gender, and regional divides Poverty underlies poor health, contributing to elevated rates of infant, childhood, and maternal mortality. Of those living in poverty in Latin America, nearly half are children. Due to their undernourishment, a quarter of Latin American children (and as many as half in rural Perú and Guatemala) are stunted in their development. Across Latin America malnutrition is an underlying cause in more than half of the deaths of children under the age of five. In Guatemala maternal mortality among indigenous women is 83 percent higher than the national average. Among the poorest fifth of the Perú’s population, 85 percent of births are not attended by trained personnel, compared to only 4 percent among the wealthiest fifth. Two-thirds of Latin American municipalities do not treat their sewage prior to dumping it into adjacent rivers or the sea. In Panamá, three in ten homes lack access to improved sanitation (sewage disposal), and in Perú, nearly four in ten lack this essential service. Yet with all this effluvium flowing out, still three-quarters of Latin America municipalities do not check public drinking water supplies for impurities. One-quarter of Latin Americans do not have in-home potable water. [30] In Latin America nearly two-thirds of hospital admissions are due to diseases related to the lack of sanitation. Diarrhea accounts for six of every ten deaths of children under the age of five in Latin America. Fresh water can save lives; for each percentage point increase in potable water coverage, the infant mortality rate drops 1 death per 1,000 live births. Yet, Latin America is falling behind in terms of life expectancy. Life expectancy in Latin America was five years longer than East Asia in the mid-1960s, but by the mid-1990s, it was 1.2 years shorter. [31] The weight of this evidence leads to an inescapable conclusion. Cambridge economist Ha-Joon Chang has put it most succinctly, “Over the last three decades, economists…provid[ed]…theoretical justifications for financial deregulation and the unrestrained pursuit of short-term profits…[T]hey advanced theories that justified the policies that have led to slower growth…[and] higher inequality…[**E]conomics has been worse than irrelevant. Economics, as it has been practiced in the last three decades, has been positively harmful for most people**.” [32] The Twilight of Neoliberalism “There is no alternative [to free market policies],” the late British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher once pronounced, but across Latin America, there has been a steady erosion of support for the free market model. At present three-quarters of Latin America governments can be fairly characterized as being governed by center-left or left-oriented leaders. Moreover, there has been a far-reaching reassessment of the relevance of IMF advice, especially after the organization’s punishingly controversial response to the 1997-1998 Asian economic crisis. The Asian economic meltdown brought the reflexive recommendations from the IMF in the form of harsh austerity measures. However, the pro-cyclical policies demanded by the IMF of its client states so plainly worsened the economic situation and needlessly caused considerable human misery that the IMF’s reputation was badly damaged. In the wake of IMF’s subsequent mishandling of the 1998 economic crises in Russia and Brazil, large private lenders, especially among the European ones, stopped requiring IMF assurances that borrowing nations follow neoliberal strictures. As Richard Peet has noted, “the…[IMF]’s reputation has never recovered, even in circles that the Fund values. [...] The power of the IMF has been reduced by failed crisis management, [with] countries paying up as quickly as possible and distancing themselves” from the IMF. [33] European lenders concluded that new loans to non-neoliberal Latin American states would perform handsomely, which, in fact, they have. The IMF’s power to impose neoliberal policies on debtor nations has been seriously compromised. Source: herslookingatyousquid.worldpress.com Argentina, following its severe economic crisis in 2001-2002, proved that a nation could successfully challenge the IMF. Argentina defaulted on its $100 billion USD foreign debt and renegotiated its obligations, paying off its loans at a fraction of the original cost. Buenos Aires finished retiring its debt to the IMF in 2005, benefitting greatly from Venezuelan assistance. In offering the money, the late Hugo Chávez promised that, “if additional help is needed to help Argentina finally free itself from the claws of the International Monetary Fund, Argentina can count on us.” [34] Other Latin American nations looked on as Argentina defied the IMF, and continued to watch as Argentina’s economy soared, growing faster than any other nation in the Western Hemisphere after it abandoned IMF-imposed economic policies. Soon a stampede of those flouting IMF mandates followed, with each new defection providing courage to all those nations rejecting neoliberalism. Other international lenders appeared as well. Venezuela loaned money to other countries in the region, including Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua, but only if they ignored the counsel of the IMF. The Bank of the South, established in 2007, joined Venezuela with Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Paraguay as an alternative source for credit. China, which does not particularly care what the IMF recommends, is also supplying capital. Furthermore, some primary commodity export prices have increased, in part due to the demand for Chinese imports (for example, Argentine soya). This has allowed several Latin American states to build up their financial reserves, making new foreign borrowing less pressing. Today the IMF can coerce only the most feeble economies, mainly now in sub-Sahara Africa. The political landscape has shifted too. By the late 1990s, many of the aging left-wing political parties built around organized labor had been flattened by the assault on unions mounted under neoliberalism. At first voters were willing to give candidates who supported the neoliberal program a chance; nevertheless, as it became increasingly clear that these policies were failing, those who spoke out against neoliberalism were elected in growing numbers. The trouble was that once in office they too often carried out neoliberal programs anyway, as for example with Abdalá Bucaram (1996-1997) or Lucio Gutiérrez (2003-2005) in Ecuador, either because they secretly favored such policies, because the IMF persuaded them to do so, or both. With the traditional left-leaning parties marginalized in several countries and the abandonment of anti-neoliberal promises by elected politicians, ordinary citizens had to develop new political methods to defend themselves. Neoliberal policies so savaged the working class, as well as the urban marginalized and the hard-pressed peasantry, that they had no choice but to organize and fight back. To this end, they created new organizations and, in some cases, used them to seize power. By pressing the neoliberal agenda, the Latin American élites appeared to have overplayed their hand, and they paid for it by losing control of governments that they had controlled for many years, in Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, and beyond. A 2009 Latinobarómetro Survey found that support for democracy (as preferable to all other forms of government) was the strongest in countries that flatly rejected neoliberalism. Of the top five nations in popular support of democracy, four were governed by progressive leaders: Venezuela, Bolivia, Uruguay, and El Salvador. [35] Hope for the Future? Supporters of the free market approach have continued to counsel patience. They argue that stronger economic growth will eventually come, and that all will benefit in the long run. While neoliberal reforms might cause some short-term belt tightening, defenders explain that such adjustments, though sometimes painful, are necessary for the greatest good. We should not give in to “reform fatigue,” but should stay the course. [36] But neoliberal policies have been in place for over 30 years now. How long is the long run? How long must we wait? As John Maynard Keynes famously observed, “In the long run we are all dead.” In 1937 U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt observed, “We have always known that heedless self-interest was bad morals. We know now that it is bad economics.” [37] The age of neoliberalism is ending. It is time for some good economics.

Unchecked neoliberal expansions risks extinction

Nhanenge 7 (Jytte Masters @ U South Africa, “ECOFEMINSM: TOWARDS INTEGRATING THE CONCERNS OF WOMEN, POOR PEOPLE AND NATURE INTO DEVELOPMENT)

There is today an increasing critique of economic development, whether it takes place in the North or in the South. Although the world on average generates more and more wealth, the riches do not appear to "trickle down" to the poor and improve their material well-being. Instead, poverty and economic inequality is growing. Despite the existence of development aid for more than half a century, the Third World seems not to be "catching up" with the First World. Instead, militarism, dictatorship and human repression is multiplied. Since the mid 1970, the critique of global economic activities has intensified due to the escalating deterioration of the natural environment. Modernization, industrialisation and its economic activities have been directly linked to increased scarcity of natural resources and generation of pollution, which increases global temperatures and degrades soils, lands, water, forests and air. The latter threat is of great significance, because without a healthy environment human beings and animals will not be able to survive. Most people believed that modernization of the world would improve material well-being for all. However, faced with its negative side effects and the real threat of extinction, one must conclude that somewhere along the way "progress" went astray. Instead of material plenty, economic development generated a violent, unhealthy and unequal world. It is a world where a small minority live in material luxury, while millions of people live in misery. These poor people are marginalized by the global economic system. They are forced to survive from degraded environments; they live without personal or social security; they live in abject poverty, with hunger, malnutrition and sickness; and they have no possibility to speak up for themselves and demand a fair share of the world's resources. The majority of these people are women, children, traditional peoples, tribal peoples, people of colour and materially poor people (called women and Others). They are, together with nature, dominated by the global system of economic development imposed by the North. It is this scenario, which is the subject of the dissertation. The overall aim is consequently to discuss the unjustified domination of women, Others and nature and to show how the domination of women and Others is interconnected with the domination of nature. A good place to start a discussion about domination of women, Others and nature is to disclose how they disproportionately must carry the negative effects from global economic development. The below discussion is therefore meant to give an idea of the "flip-side" of modernisation. It gives a gloomy picture of what "progress" and its focus on economic growth has meant for women, poor people and the natural environment. The various complex and inter-connected, negative impacts have been ordered into four crises. The categorization is inspired by Paul Ekins and his 1992 book "A new world order; grassroots movements for global change". In it, Ekins argues that humanity is faced with four interlocked crises of unprecedented magnitude. These crises have the potential to destroy whole ecosystems and to extinct the human race. The first crisis is the spread of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, together with the high level of military spending. The second crisis is the increasing number of people afflicted with hunger and poverty. The third crisis is the environmental degradation. Pollution, destruction of ecosystems and extinction of species are increasing at such a rate that the biosphere is under threat. The fourth crisis is repression and denial of fundamental human rights by governments, which prevents people from developing their potential. It is highly likely that one may add more crises to these four, or categorize them differently, however, Ekins's division is suitable for the present purpose. (Ekins 1992: 1).

The alternative is to reject the 1AC in favor of non-hegemonic engagement

Broillet, 10 – Current Concerns > 2010 > No 8, May 2010 > Latin America: The Advent of an Alternative to Neo-Liberalism and Authoritarian Socialism http://www.currentconcerns.ch/index.php?id=1028

A different world is possible and not utopian Building a different world can only succeed by political means, involving states and their governments – new states, anti-neoliberal governments, but also governments not entirely anti-neoliberal. In a different world social movements must not replace the productive field. Social movements have to engage in a new dialogue with politics. With a false understanding of this dialogue the social movements would exclude themselves from political processes of profound economic, social, political and cultural change. In Bolivia, Venezuela, Ecuador and some other countries the social movements might get into opposition that way and hold their corporative positions against the development of political alternatives. (I am not talking about non-government organizations, a much more severe case.) In the name of the “autonomy of the social movements”, which has developed into a fundamental issue in some cases, they exclude themselves from building a different possible world. If it is about the question of maintaining autonomy against the subordination of popular interests, there is no problem. But if social movements and the political level oppose each other, we fall back on corporatist positions – supposedly in the name of the ‘civil society’ – with the risk to give up the political struggle with the traditional forces, which reproduce the dominating system. This autonomy can be good to resist neo-liberalism but it is an absolute obstacle if we want to build another possible world and not only claim it to be possible. The best way to talk about it is to build it and that will be impossible without a new hegemonic model – economic, social, political and cultural, a new type of power, a new society, a new world in all its globality. Resuming the political struggle in a new manner means for the World Social Forum of Porto Alegre to focus on the fight against war above all. Moreover, it means to seriously take into account the new possible world which has started to be built in Latin America. Neo-liberalism tries to discourage any form of regulation by the state and to discredit the role of the policy and of all forms of government in favor of an expanded market. The quest for a different political practice is thus part of the struggle for another possible world, and Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador show that is at the same time possible and essential for the construction of a new type of society. Conclusion Liberalization To conclude, we can say that many developing countries in Latin America take the route of liberalization. We can also suppose that these countries will adopt a new developmental strategy because their leaders think that an approach favorable to the market is the “optimal” strategy. The selected strategy promises to cure two fundamental deficiencies simultaneously: the lack of financial means and the absence of a clear definition of the state’s role in this development. I claim that these two fundamental problems have not yet been solved, but short-circuited by the indetermination of the reforms during the current historical period, known as period of transition. The long period of transition, which the strategy based on liberalism or liberalization implies, requires important intervention by the state; whereas the launching of reforms undoubtedly does not allow meeting the financing needs of the economy, the social reorganization, the recognition of the cultural affairs as well as the freedom of expression, of thought and basic rights. This was the case in Chile. From the present analysis, we can draw the following conclusions: Phase 1: The transitional period is very long and difficult to manage. The liberalization of foreign trade, interior markets, and the social reforms related to the governmental structures, all these aspects are combined with those of acceptable political programs. Phase 2: The period of stabilization may last for a very long time, at least until the completion of phase 1, when the country will have restored its reputation of solvency. Phase 3: The period of determining the effects of certain measurements, because it is not true that the economy proves that liberalized markets are always the best. Phase 4: The period of stagnation and balance will only eventuate if the chronological order of the reforms has been applied. Ideology, utopia and identity I would like to add one last optimistic reflection which will put an end to my contribution. According to what I tried to show before, the ideas and the different interests of a whole people generally join in a sanguinary struggle for life. This “ideology” should be taken serious because, actually, with the appearance of the human consciousness of what is good and what is evil, the structure of our socio-cultural environment based on the finality of peace and non-violence is no longer a utopian dream, but also a necessary objective, both essential for all the Latin-Americans and the whole humanity. If this utopia determines the discussions of a group, it is not only an ideological unit, but also a mentality or a structure which organizes the dominant ideas – a transcendent ideal, and the rebellion of an oppressed class. The positive function of a utopia is thus to explore what is feasible, and to exploit the possibilities reality offers. Without closing too quickly, I would say that the significance of ideology and utopia enables us to illustrate the two sides of the dynamics between power and imagination. The problem of power and imagination remains, for me, the most attractive structure of existence. To open ourselves to the imaginary unexpected and unforeseen belongs to our identity. The identity of the Latin-American people and communities is also an unsettled prospective identity. This also applies to the structure of identity as a symbolic structure which constitutes imagination and which is reflected not only as ideology and utopia, but also as reality and fiction. My conviction is that we are always captured in this oscillation between ideology and utopia. Those who have neither projects nor objectives do not have anything to describe.

## Off

Mexico violates human rights

UN, 5/3 – (UN News Centre, “Mexico must strengthen its protection of human rights, reduce use of military – UN expert,” http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44817&Cr=Mexico&Cr1=#.Uc9VcPm1FqW)

A United Nations independent expert today urged the Mexican Government to strengthen the national structures that protect human rights, in particular the right to life, and reduce the involvement of the military in policing to reduce the use of force in the country. “There seems to be wide agreement among various levels of Government and civil society that the long term solution to the problem of violence in Mexico lies in establishing a strong law enforcement system compliant with international standards surrounding the right to life,” the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christoph Heyns, said at the end of a visit to the country. “The need to achieve this goal as soon as possible should be the guiding star of all policy and other reforms.” Mr. Heyns welcomed the announcement of a number of initiatives aimed at moving the country from relying on the military for internal security. Some of them are already in the process of implementation. “The policies that have been announced should be fully implemented. The involvement of members of civil society in this process is crucial,” Mr. Heyns said. “There is no easy fix, but a slow and steady commitment to strengthening the role of the human rights framework in Mexico is the only long term solution.” He emphasized the importance of decreasing the military’s involvement in policing, ensuring that civil courts and not military ones try members of the military who have been accused of human rights violations, and establishing clear standards on the use of force by law enforcement officials. Mr. Heyns also drew special attention to the issue of ending impunity. “Each and every loss of life should be investigated with the same rigor. And each and every perpetrator should be apprehended and tried. Pursuing this objective will serve not only to decrease impunity, but to restore the value that society attaches to life,” he said.

Shun them—a priori

Beversluis, 89 (Eric H. April 1989. “On Shunning Undesirable Regimes: Ethics and Economic Sanctions.” Public Affairs Quarterly, April, vol. 3, no. 2)

A fundamental task of morality is resolving conflicting interests. If we both want the same piece of land, ethics provides a basis for resolving the conflict by identifying "mine" and "thine." If in anger 1 want to smash your face, ethics indicates that your face's being unsmashed is a legitimate interest of yours which takes precedence over my own interest in expressing my rage. Thus ethics identifies the rights of individuals when their interests conflict. But how can a case for shunning be made on this view of morality? Whose interests (rights) does shunning protect? The shunner may well have to sacrifice his interest, e.g., by foregoing a beneficial trade relationship, but whose rights are thereby protected? In shunning there seem to be no "rights" that are protected. For shunning, as we have seen, does not assume that the resulting cost will change the disapproved behavior. If economic sanctions against South Africa will not bring apartheid to an end, and thus will not help the blacks get their rights, on what grounds might it be a duty to impose such sanctions'? We find the answer when we note that there is another "level" of moral duties. When Galtung speaks of "reinforcing... morality," he has identified a duty that goes beyond specific acts of respecting people's rights. The argument goes like this: There is more involved in respecting the rights of others than not violating them by one's actions. For if there is such a thing as a moral order, which unites people in a moral community, then surely one has a duty (at least prima facie) not only to avoid violating the rights of others with one's actions but also to support that moral order. Consider that the moral order itself contributes significantly to people's rights being respected. It does so by encouraging and reinforcing moral behavior and by discouraging and sanctioning immoral behavior. In this moral community people mutually reinforce each other's moral behavior and thus raise the overall level of morality. Were this moral order to disintegrate, were people to stop reinforcing each other's moral behavior, there would be much more violation of people's rights. Thus to the extent that behavior affects the moral order, it indirectly affects people's rights. And this is where shunning fits in. Certain types of behavior constitute a direct attack on the moral order. When the violation of human rights is flagrant, willful, and persistent, the offender is, as it were, thumbing her nose at the moral order, publicly rejecting it as binding her behavior. Clearly such behavior, if tolerated by society, will weaken and perhaps eventually undermine altogether the moral order. Let us look briefly at those three conditions which turn immoral behavior into an attack on the moral order. An immoral action is flagrant if it is "extremely or deliberately conspicuous; notorious, shocking." Etymologically the word means "burning" or "blazing." The definition of shunning implies therefore that those offenses require shunning which are shameless or indiscreet, which the person makes no effort to hide and no good-faith effort to excuse. Such actions "blaze forth" as an attack on the moral order. But to merit shunning the action must also be, willful and persistent. We do not consider the actions of the "backslider," the weak-willed, the one-time offender to be challenges to the moral order. It is the repeat offender, the unrepentent sinner, the cold-blooded violator of morality whose behavior demands that others publicly reaffirm the moral order. When someone flagrantly, willfully, and repeatedly violates the moral order, those who believe in the moral order, the members of the moral community, must respond in a way that reaffirms the legitimacy of that moral order. How does shunning do this? First, by refusing publicly to have to do with such a person one announces support for the moral order and backs up the announcement with action. This action reinforces the commitment to the moral order both of the shunner and of the other members of the community. (Secretary of State Shultz in effect made this argument in his caB for international sanctions on Libya in the early days of 1986.). . Further, shunning may have a moral effect on the shunned person, even if the direct impact is not adequate to change the immoral behavior. If the shunned person thinks of herself as part of the moral community, shunning may well make clear to her that she is, in fact, removing herself from that community by the behavior in question. Thus shunning may achieve by moral suasion what cannot be achieved by "force." Finally, shunning may be a form of punishment, of moral sanction, whose appropriateness depends not on whether it will change the person's behavior, but on whether he deserves the punishment for violating the moral order. Punishment than can be viewed as a way of maintaining the moral order, of "purifying the community" after it has been made "unclean," as ancient communities might have put it.

## Econ

Doha, FTAA, different policies, lack of LA participation, Mercosur, recession, Brazil, socialism are all alt causes

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Latin America is poised to assume a starring role in the governance of international trade, with a Brazilian having been selected to lead the World Trade Organization and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) set to enter its 17th round of talks in Peru later this month. Many hope an agreement on the TPP will provide a much-needed boost to a still prostrate global economy, but what is being widely hailed as profound progress in the evolution of trade integration globally is having the opposite effect in Latin America. Rather than deepening trade ties within the region, the TPP is serving to expose and exacerbate underlying political and economic fractures, raising question about how deep Latin American trade cooperation can be, and whether the Americas are fated to continue to be divided along trade policy lines.¶ Praised as a cutting edge agreement to address 21st century cross-border commercial issues, the TPP will unite a dozen nations with the goal of establishing a core free trade area for the Asia-Pacific region. The bloc will account for more than 30% of global GDP and 20% of the world's exports -- which would grow considerably with the inclusion of Japan and South Korea - which are both actively exploring entry in the Partnership. Many potential signatories, including the U.S., have expressed a desire for conclusion of the Partnership this year. As is the case with any multilateral negotiation, getting to the finish line has not been easy.¶ The derailment of nsegotiations over the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) and the Doha Development Round had a significant impact on the perceived realism of regional trade agreements, while negatively effecting Latin America's ability to uniformly and robustly engage with its largest trading partners. The radically different trade policy paths that have emerged - pitting the notion of collaboration against economic nationalism -- have given rise to a region divided over how, and whether, it should approach trade liberalization going forward.¶ Within Latin America, only Chile, Mexico and Peru are currently party to the TPP. The three formed the Pacific Alliance (PA) in 2012, along with Colombia, which also hopes to join the Partnership. All four have made significant commitments towards trade liberalization. The PA members have concluded FTAs with one another and with the U.S., have implemented numerous bilateral trade agreements, and share a number of overlapping trade agreements that include several Asian countries. Membership in the TPP would facilitate increased integration with one another and offer a more coordinated approach to expanding trade with Asia. In conjunction with the members of the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), it should one day be possible to create a supply chain running up the Pacific coast from Chile to Mexico.¶ On the other side of the spectrum are Latin America's "Atlantic" countries, whose approach to regional and global integration has taken a dramatically different course. Mercosur, the once promising common market, now includes the protectionist wing of Latin America that has come to include Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, along with socialist Bolivia and Venezuela. Between them, the ability to make genuine progress along regional trade lines has proven challenging.¶ During the commodities boom these countries prospered, but as a result of the global recession, growth waned and a propensity toward protectionism became common. The customs union that in the 1990s united its members to reduce trade barriers, forge a common trade policy, and actively participate in the FTAA negotiations has been transformed into one of the most protectionist blocs in Latin America, with its members routinely employing tariffs, taxes, and trade restrictions against one another. This has limited Mercosur's general appeal in and outside of Latin America. Mercosur has largely withdrawn from pursuing FTAs altogether, and its policies over the past decade have failed to consolidate meaningful partnerships with any of its primary trading partners.¶ In order to mitigate the impact of a divided Latin America and prevent the schism from intensifying, robust multilateral negotiations must be reconstituted. Much of what happens next will be influenced by the actions of the U.S., given its leadership role in the TPP. A primary obstacle that must be overcome is the Brazil/US relationship, which was a major impediment during the Doha round. Brazil is not currently party to any major multilateral trade initiative, and two of the principal agreements it has signed in recent years -- CELAC and UNASUR -- specifically exclude the U.S. Additionally, Mercosur requires that its members negotiate trade agreements in unison, meaning Brazil will need to find a way to compromise, as will its neighbors.¶ The U.S. has scored notable trade-related achievements in the past several years, mostly in the form of bilateral trade agreements, but these took far too long to accomplish and were highly politicized. Given this, it seems unrealistic to hope for any near term breakthroughs in future multilateral negotiations that rely on the U.S. for leadership. If the region continues to be a secondary priority of U.S. foreign and economic policy, large segments of Latin America will continue to be left out of the broader trade integration picture.¶ The announcement that the Obama administration will be sending Joe Biden to Brazil, Colombia, and Trinidad and Tobago later this month in what the Vice President called "the most active stretch of high-level engagement on Latin America in a long, long time" suggests that Mr. Obama would like part of his legacy to be a closer relationship with Latin America. To do so would at the same time require finding a way to reduce the appeal of 21st century socialism in a variety of countries in Latin America - something that seems improbable during his tenure.¶ The most likely near-term outcome is that the U.S. will take a leadership role in pushing for additional Latin American countries to join the TPP, starting with Colombia, Costa Rica, and Panama. All three countries have undertaken significant commitments toward liberalizing trade, have shifted the focus of their trade policies to Asia, and have expressed interest in joining the TPP. Colombia is the best fit, as it already has agreements with five TPP members, is finalizing agreements with Japan and South Korea, and sends nearly half its exports to the TPP-12. While such a development may reinforce the emerging split between Mercosur and the Pacific Alliance, it may also eventually help encourage the adoption of more open trade policies that can counter the protectionist tendencies that have arisen.¶ Greater Latin American participation in the TPP will surely serve to strengthen the Partnership and the region. If the negotiations are able to successfully address the two biggest problems facing the TPP in Latin America -- synchronizing the dozens of bilateral agreements that exist between members and non-members, and bringing other countries into the TPP -- then the agreement will serve to reinforce integration into the global supply chain and effectively sidestep sclerotic multilateral trade talks at the WTO. Failure to reach agreement may mean that rather than encouraging mutual prosperity through deeper economic ties, the level of political and economic discord surrounding trade in Latin America will rise.¶ Given the stakes involved, all countries participating in the negotiations need to recognize what is in their mutual long-term interests, step up to the plate, and do what is needed to make the TPP a reality. However, given the track record of lengthy and ultimately unsuccessful multilateral trade negotiations in recent history, it is more likely that any agreement will take much more time to be concluded. In the meantime, the spaghetti bowl of bilateral trade agreements will continue to undermine efforts to achieve multilateral solutions to the region's trade challenges.

**Trade doesn’t solve war**

**Martin et. al. 8** (Phillipe, University of Paris 1 Pantheon—Sorbonne, Paris School of Economics, and Centre for Economic Policy Research; Thierry MAYER, University of Paris 1 Pantheon—Sorbonne, Paris School of Economics, CEPII, and Centre for Economic Policy Research, Mathias THOENIG, University of Geneva and Paris School of Economics, The Review of Economic Studies 75)

Does globalization pacify international relations? The “liberal” view in political science argues that increasing trade flows and the spread of free markets and democracy should limit the incentive to use military force in interstate relations. This vision, which can partly be traced back to Kant’s Essay on Perpetual Peace (1795), has been very influential: The main objective of the European trade integration process was to prevent the killing and destruction of the two World Wars from ever happening again.1 Figure 1 suggests2 however, that during the 1870–2001 period, the correlation between trade openness and military conflicts is not a clear cut one. The first era of globalization, at the end of the 19th century, was a period of rising trade openness and multiple military conflicts, culminating with World War I. Then, the interwar period was characterized by a simultaneous collapse of world trade and conflicts. After World War II, world trade increased rapidly, while the number of conflicts decreased (although the risk of a global conflict was obviously high). There is no clear evidence that the 1990s, during which trade flows increased dramatically, was a period of lower prevalence of military conflicts, even taking into account the increase in the number of sovereign states.

**Trade will never collapse**

Ikenson, 9

[Daniel, associate director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, “ A Protectionism Fling: Why Tariff Hikes and Other Trade Barriers Will Be Short-Lived,” March 12, 2009, http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=10651]

Although some governments will dabble in some degree of protectionism, the combination of a sturdy rules-based system of trade and the economic self interest in being open to participation in the global economy will limit the risk of a protectionist pandemic. According to recent estimates from the International Food Policy Research Institute, if all WTO members were to raise all of their applied tariffs to the maximum bound rates, the average global rate of duty would double and the value of global trade would decline by 7.7 percent over five years.8 That would be a substantial decline relative to the 5.5 percent annual rate of trade growth experienced this decade.9¶ But, to put that 7.7 percent decline in historical perspective, the value of global trade declined by 66 percent between 1929 and 1934, a period mostly in the wake of Smoot Hawley's passage in 1930.10 So the potential downside today from what Bergsten calls "legal protectionism" is actually not that "massive," even if all WTO members raised all of their tariffs to the highest permissible rates.¶ If most developing countries raised their tariffs to their bound rates, there would be an adverse impact on the countries that raise barriers and on their most important trade partners. But most developing countries that have room to backslide (i.e., not China) are not major importers, and thus the impact on global trade flows would not be that significant. OECD countries and China account for the top twothirds of global import value.11 Backsliding from India, Indonesia, and Argentina (who collectively account for 2.4 percent of global imports) is not going to be the spark that ignites a global trade war. Nevertheless, governments are keenly aware of the events that transpired in the 1930s, and have made various pledges to avoid protectionist measures in combating the current economic situation.¶ In the United States, after President Obama publicly registered his concern that the "Buy American" provision in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act might be perceived as protectionist or could incite a trade war, Congress agreed to revise the legislation to stipulate that the Buy American provision "be applied in a manner consistent with United States obligations under international agreements." In early February, China's vice commerce minister, Jiang Zengwei, announced that China would not include "Buy China" provisions in its own $586 billion stimulus bill.12¶ But even more promising than pledges to avoid trade provocations are actions taken to reduce existing trade barriers. In an effort to "reduce business operating costs, attract and retain foreign investment, raise business productivity, and provide consumers a greater variety and better quality of goods and services at competitive prices," the Mexican government initiated a plan in January to unilaterally reduce tariffs on about 70 percent of the items on its tariff schedule. Those 8,000 items, comprising 20 different industrial sectors, accounted for about half of all Mexican import value in 2007. When the final phase of the plan is implemented on January 1, 2013, the average industrial tariff rate in Mexico will have fallen from 10.4 percent to 4.3 percent.13¶ And Mexico is not alone. In February, the Brazilian government suspended tariffs entirely on some capital goods imports and reduced to 2 percent duties on a wide variety of machinery and other capital equipment, and on communications and information technology products.14 That decision came on the heels of late-January decision in Brazil to scrap plans for an import licensing program that would have affected 60 percent of the county's imports.15¶ Meanwhile, on February 27, a new free trade agreement was signed between Australia, New Zealand, and the 10 member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to reduce and ultimately eliminate tariffs on 96 percent of all goods by 2020.¶ While the media and members of the trade policy community fixate on how various protectionist measures around the world might foreshadow a plunge into the abyss, there is plenty of evidence that governments remain interested in removing barriers to trade. Despite the occasional temptation to indulge discredited policies, there is a growing body of institutional knowledge that when people are free to engage in commerce with one another as they choose, regardless of the nationality or location of the other parties, they can leverage that freedom to accomplish economic outcomes far more impressive than when governments attempt to limit choices through policy constraints.

**Trade doesn’t solve war**

**Mearsheimer 1**, American professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, (John, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 370-371)

There are problems with this perspective, too." In particular, there is always the possibility that a serious economic crisis in some important region, or in the world at large, will undermine the prosperity that this theory needs to work. For example, it is widely believed that Asia's "economic miracle" worked to dampen security competition in that region before 1997, but that the 1997-98 financial crisis in Asia helped foster a "new geopolitics."24 It is also worth noting that although the United States led a successful effort to contain that financial crisis, it was a close call, and there is no guarantee that the next crisis will not spread across the globe. But even in the absence of a major economic crisis, one or more states might not prosper; such a state would have little to lose economically, and maybe even something to gain, by starting a war. A key reason that Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in August 1990 was that Kuwait was exceeding its oil production quotas (set by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, or OPEC) and driving down Iraq's oil profits, which the Iraqi economy could ill-afford.25 There are two other reasons to doubt the claim that economic interdependence makes great-power war unlikely. States usually go to war against a single rival, and they aim to win a quick and decisive victory. Also, they invariably seek to discourage other states from joining with the other side in the fight. But a war against one or even two opponents is unlikely to do much damage to a state's economy, because typically only a tiny percentage of a state's wealth is tied up in economic intercourse with any other state. It is even possible, as discussed in Chapter 5, that conquest will produce significant economic benefits. Finally, an important historical case contradicts this perspective. As noted above, there was probably about as much economic interdependence in Europe between 1900 and 1914 as there is today. Those were also prosperous years for the European great powers. Yet World War I broke out in 1914. Thus a highly interdependent world economy does not make great-power war more or less likely. Great powers must be forever vigilant and never subordinate survival to any other goal, including prosperity.

**Deficit inevitable**

Bleckler 11 (Robert A. Blecker is a professor of economics and chair of the economics department at American University and a research associate of EPI., May 2011, "Global Imbalances and the US Trade Deficit", nw08.american.edu/~blecker/research/Blecker\_Imbalances\_May2011.pdf)

This chapter has shown that the U.S. trade deficit has been sustained by a set of selfreinforcing, mutually supportive mechanisms that are difficult to break out of, although they were temporarily suppressed during the severe economic downturn of 2008-9. No single policy lever will quickly or painlessly alter the position of the U.S. as the main deficit country in the global pattern of trade imbalances. Traditional remedies, such as reducing the budget deficit or depreciating the dollar, will not be sufficient, although the latter is likely to be much more helpful than the former. Moreover, the U.S. trade deficit results not only from U.S. actions and policies, but also from events and policies in other countries—especially the insufficient domestic demand and currency market interventions of the major surplus nations in East Asia and elsewhere. For the U.S. to be weaned off of its reliance on imports of cheap consumer goods and outsourced intermediate goods and its dependency on external borrowing, the rest of the world needs to be weaned off of its reliance on U.S. markets for export demand and U.S. assets as repositories for wealth accumulation.

**No impact to the economy**

**Barnett, 9** – senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC and a contributing editor/online columnist for Esquire magazine (Thomas P.M., August 2009“The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis” http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx

When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape. None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends. And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces. So, to sum up: \* No significant uptick in mass violence or unrest (remember the smattering of urban riots last year in places like Greece, Moldova and Latvia?); \* The usual frequency maintained in civil conflicts (in all the usual places); \* Not a single state-on-state war directly caused (and no great-power-on-great-power crises even triggered); \* No great improvement or disruption in great-power cooperation regarding the emergence of new nuclear powers (despite all that diplomacy); \* A modest scaling back of international policing efforts by the system's acknowledged Leviathan power (inevitable given the strain); and \* No serious efforts by any rising great power to challenge that Leviathan or supplant its role. (The worst things we can cite are Moscow's occasional deployments of strategic assets to the Western hemisphere and its weak efforts to outbid the United States on basing rights in Kyrgyzstan; but the best include China and India stepping up their aid and investments in Afghanistan and Iraq.) Sure, we've finally seen global defense spending surpass the previous world record set in the late 1980s, but even that's likely to wane given the stress on public budgets created by all this unprecedented "stimulus" spending. If anything, the friendly cooperation on such stimulus packaging was the most notable great-power dynamic caused by the crisis. Can we say that the world has suffered a distinct shift to political radicalism as a result of the economic crisis? Indeed, no. The world's major economies remain governed by center-left or center-right political factions that remain decidedly friendly to both markets and trade. In the short run, there were attempts across the board to insulate economies from immediate damage (in effect, as much protectionism as allowed under current trade rules), but there was no great slide into "trade wars." Instead, the World Trade Organization is functioning as it was designed to function, and regional efforts toward free-trade agreements have not slowed. Can we say Islamic radicalism was inflamed by the economic crisis? If it was, that shift was clearly overwhelmed by the Islamic world's growing disenchantment with the brutality displayed by violent extremist groups such as al-Qaida. And looking forward, austere economic times are just as likely to breed connecting evangelicalism as disconnecting fundamentalism. At the end of the day, the economic crisis did not prove to be sufficiently frightening to provoke major economies into establishing global regulatory schemes, even as it has sparked a spirited -- and much needed, as I argued last week -- discussion of the continuing viability of the U.S. dollar as the world's primary reserve currency. Naturally, plenty of experts and pundits have attached great significance to this debate, seeing in it the beginning of "economic warfare" and the like between "fading" America and "rising" China. And yet, in a world of globally integrated production chains and interconnected financial markets, such "diverging interests" hardly constitute signposts for wars up ahead. Frankly, I don't welcome a world in which America's fiscal profligacy goes undisciplined, so bring it on -- please! Add it all up and it's fair to say that this global financial crisis has proven the great resilience of America's post-World War II international liberal trade order. Do I expect to read any analyses along those lines in the blogosphere any time soon? Absolutely not. I expect the fantastic fear-mongering to proceed apace. That's what the Internet is for.

## China

Canada’s an alt cause

Cowan, their author 12 - President of the Annenberg Foundation Trust at Sunnylands ("A Stronger Future: Policy Recommendations for U.S.-Mexico Relations, Wilson Center, sunnylands.org/files/posts/159/stronger\_f.pdf ) //JG

Policy Option: Mexico and Canada have each joined the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations, and the United States should work closely with its North American partners as negotiations proceed. Mexico, the United States, and Canada have each begun to reorient their foreign policy to focus more attention on the Asia-Pacific region. The question now is whether they will pivot individually or do so as members of a North American strategic and economic partnership. In efforts to strengthen relationships with nations throughout Asia, grow trade, or push nations to respect their WTO obligations, the countries of North America are more competitive and convincing when working together. North American cooperation brings together three distinct and important voices: Canada, the consummate multilateralist; Mexico, a large and important growth market; and the United States, still the world’s top superpower. The Trans-Pacific Partnership is an obvious place to begin to articulate and enact such a stance. The TPP has the potential to strengthen North America’s own integration while taking steps forward toward the strategic goals of both the United States and Mexico.

**Diverging interests takes out your terminal impacts**

**Feigenbaum 11** (Evan- writer for Council on foreign relations. “Does US-China strategic cooperation have to be so hard?” 11/5. <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/10/05/does-us-china-strategic-cooperation-have-to-be-so-hard/>)

For their part, Chinese officials often view US policies in these countries as naïve at best, destabilising at worst. Many in Beijing hold the view that US and South Korean ‘failures’ have cornered North Korea and thus urge deepened policies of engagement. In Central Asia, meanwhile, as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the region in 2006 and 2007, I heard Chinese officials argue ad infinitum that US actions to promote political reform could, ultimately, destabilise these countries. What’s going on? Does cooperation really have to be so hard? For that matter, is coordination so hard because the US and China lack common interests? I think not. In fact, asserting so is a too-easy cop out because, in most cases, it would be awfully hard to demonstrate empirically that China actually ‘wants’ an unstable Pakistan or would just ‘love’ a North Korea with nuclear weapons. In the countries at the heart of this CFR study, why wouldn’t China share America’s interest in stability, security, development and prosperity? No, I suspect the problem usually isn’t a lack of common interests. It’s that shared interests are very general in nature. Turning (abstract) common interests into (concrete) complementary policies requires that Beijing and Washington overcome two very high hurdles: First, Beijing almost never seems to share American threat assessments anymore. Countries like Iran and North Korea don’t threaten China directly, so Beijing can probably afford to be more relaxed and many Chinese analysts argue that Washington overstates the scope and urgency of such threats. Second, even when Beijing shares America’s sense of threat, countervailing interests still obstruct cooperation. In Afghanistan, for example, China certainly shares America’s core interest: a stable Afghan state that does not harbour, nurture or export terrorism. But Chinese decision-makers have become uncomfortable when told that the path to victory may require a long-term NATO presence on China’s western border, US bases and access agreements in Central Asia, and enhanced US and NATO strategic coordination with neighbours that have had difficult relations with China.

**China can’t catch up and no risk of war**

**Zenko and Cohen 12** (Micah Zenko, Fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations, and MIchael Cohen, Senior Fellow at the American Security Project, serves on the board of the National Security Network and has taught at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs, served in the U.S. Department of State, former Senior Vice President at the strategic communications firm of Robinson, Lerer and Montgomery, bachelor’s degree in international relations from American University and a master’s degree from Columbia University, 3/14/2012, "Clear and Present Safety", yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/clear-and-present-safety)

As the threat from transnational terrorist groups dwindles, the United States also faces few risks from other states. China is the most obvious potential rival to the United States, and there is little doubt that China’s rise will pose a challenge to U.S. economic interests. Moreover, there is an unresolved debate among Chinese political and military leaders about China’s proper global role, and the lack of transparency from China’s senior leadership about its long-term foreign policy objectives is a cause for concern. However, **the present security threat to the U.S. mainland is practically nonexistent and will remain so**. Even as China tries to modernize its military, its defense spending is still approximately one-ninth that of the United States. In 2012, the Pentagon will spend roughly as much on military research and development alone as China will spend on its entire military. While China clumsily flexes its muscles in the Far East by threatening to deny access to disputed maritime resources, a recent Pentagon report noted that China’s military ambitions remain dominated by “regional contingencies” and that the People’s Liberation Army has made little progress in developing capabilities that “extend global reach or power projection.” In the coming years, China will enlarge its regional role, but this growth will only threaten U.S. interests if Washington attempts to dominate East Asia and fails to consider China’s legitimate regional interests. It is true that China’s neighbors sometimes fear that China will not resolve its disputes peacefully, but this has compelled Asian countries to cooperate with the United States, maintaining bilateral alliances that together form a strong security architecture and limit China’s room to maneuver. The strongest arguments made by those warning of Chinese influence revolve around economic policy. The list of complaints includes a host of Chinese policies, from intellectual property theft and currency manipulation to economic espionage and domestic subsidies. Yet **none of those is likely to lead to direct conflict with the United States beyond the competition inherent in international trade**, which does not produce zero-sum outcomes and is constrained by dispute-resolution mechanisms, such as those of the World Trade Organization. If anything, China’s export-driven economic strategy, along with its large reserves of U.S. Treasury bonds, suggests that **Beijing will continue to prefer a strong United States to a weak one**.

**Economic incentives**

**Rachman**, chief foreign affairs commentator – Financial Times, **‘11**

(Gideon, “Think Again: American Decline,” *Foreign Policy*, Jan/Feb)

Yet even if you factor in considerable future economic and political turbulence, it would be a big mistake to assume that the Chinese challenge to U.S. power will simply disappear. Once countries get the hang of economic growth, it takes a great deal to throw them off course. The analogy to the rise of Germany from the mid-19th century onward is instructive. Germany went through two catastrophic military defeats, hyperinflation, the Great Depression, the collapse of democracy, and the destruction of its major cities and infrastructure by Allied bombs. And yet by the end of the 1950s, West Germany was once again one of the world's leading economies, albeit shorn of its imperial ambitions. **In a nuclear age, China is unlikely to get sucked into a world war**, so it will not face turbulence and disorder on remotely the scale Germany did in the 20th century. And whatever economic and political difficulties it does experience will not be enough to stop the country's rise to great-power status. Sheer size and economic momentum mean that the Chinese juggernaut will keep rolling forward, no matter what obstacles lie in its path.

**No nuclear escalation and outside powers will stay out**

**Cliff & Shlapak, 7** – Ph.D. in international relations, Princeton, M.A. in history (Chinese studies), University of California, San Diego, Assistant for Strategy Development, Office of the Secretary of Defense AND \*\*Ph.D., senior international policy analyst, RAND Project Air Force Report (Roger & David A., “U.S.–China Relations

After Resolution of Taiwan’s Status,” RAND Corporation, www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA471950‎)

This situation would occur if China attempted to use force to achieve unification, the United States intervened, and China’s efforts were defeated, but Beijing refused to accept Taiwan’s independence.10 Analysis at RAND has found that a conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan would likely be confined to the use of conventional weapons, even though both the United States and China possess nuclear weapons, and that it would not likely escalate into a broader war between the United States and China. That is, the war would be contained in the area around Taiwan; the main combatants would probably be limited to the United States, China, and Japan; and active hostilities would probably end after a relatively short time. Nonetheless, such a war would probably result in a bitter relationship between the United States and China, comparable in some ways to that between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. China might well accelerate the buildup of its military capabilities with an eye toward waging a second, this time successful, campaign to claim Taiwan. This military competition would likely also be accompanied by a broader deterioration in Sino-U.S. relations, with mutual trade and investment falling dramatically or even ceasing, and each country demanding that its allies not cooperate with its rival. Countries in Asia might find themselves under pressure to choose between good relations with the United States and good relations with China. Nonetheless, even under these circumstances, the relationship between the United States and China after an inconclusive war over Taiwan would have important differences from the one between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Unlike the Soviet Union, China is closely integrated into the world economy. With the exception of Japan, most countries in Asia would likely regard the importance of maintaining good relations with Beijing as outweighing any concerns about China having used force against Taiwan. They would resist U.S. pressure to choose between Washington and Beijing, preferring to maintain good relations with both. This logic would apply even more strongly to countries outside the region, which would be even less concerned about China’s use of force.

**Chinese relations cause Japan prolif**

**Medcalf & Evans, 9** – \* director of the International Security Program, Lowy Institute for International Policy, AND \*\* prominent Australian nuclear expert and former Foreign minister (9/25/09, Radio Australia, “The paradoxical risks of nuclear disarmament,” http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/connectasia/stories/200909/s2696542.htm)

There is acknowledgement though that process of reinvigorating nuclear disarmament carries risks. Rory Medcalf, director of the International Security Program at the Lowy Institute for International Policy, travelled to North Asia earlier this year, against the backdrop of North Korea's newly energised missile activities, taking the temperature of the issue. He's now published a paper on the issues, following an earlier seminar in Sydney. MEDCALF: If you're Japanese or South Korean, long protected by American extended nuclear deterrence and living within range of large numbers of North Korean missiles, it must be strange comfort to you at this time to be hearing President Obama talking of a world without nuclear weapons, possibly starting with US force reductions. MOTTRAM: Australia's Gareth Evans agrees. EVANS: Such allies will need to be very strongly reassured that they won't be exposed to unacceptable risk if the United States changes its posture towards a sole purpose declaration in the way that I've described. MOTTRAM: But with mistrust between Japan, China and the US in particular still sharp, and with power balances in the region shifting, Rory Medcalf says for example that **moves by the US towards what might satisfy China,** but without removing the threat from North Korea could change strategic thinking in Japan. MEDCALF: Japan's acquisition of conventional strike capabilities like cruise missiles would be one response to a growing lack of faith in US protection. And that itself could provoke all sorts of risky arms race dynamics in North Asia. And another option is Japan looking to nuclear weapons. MOTTRAM: That's least likely its widely agreed, but Japan does have the technology and the plutonium its believed to develop a substantial nuclear arsenal in a few years.

**Nuclear war**

**Interfax, ‘6** [Rick Rozoff, citing Vyacheslav Nikonov, member of the Council on Foreign Relations, dean of the faculty of political science at International University, “Nuclear Japan Would Trigger ‘Terrible Arms Race’ in Asia” 11-2006, <http://lists.econ.utah.edu/pipermail/a-list/2006-November/063410.html>]

MOSCOW - The emergence of nuclear weapons in Japan would trigger an arms race in Asia and neighboring regions, Politika Foundation President Vyacheslav Nikonov said.  "The situation would take a very dangerous turn should Japan take this path: the nonproliferation regime would be undermined and a terrible arms race would begin in Asia," Nikonov told Interfax on Tuesday.  Nikonov made these remarks while commenting on the Japanese government's statement that Japan could legally possess nuclear weapons "however minimal the arsenal might be."  "If this happens, South Korea could claim nuclear status and China would no longer put up with the small nuclear arsenal it has. The chain reaction would then entangle India, Pakistan and Iran," the Russian expert said.  "This race could ultimately result in the use of such weapons," he said.

**Chinese relations cause North Korea to freak out and go nuclear**

**Shen, 9** (Dingli, Professor of International Relations, Executive Dean of the Institute of International Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai, & Director of Center for American Studies at Fudan University, October, “Cooperative Denuclearization toward North Korea”, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 32 No. 4, pg. 183-4, FT & RV)

It seems obvious that North Korea’s survival could serve China’s national security interests, especially in light of the Taiwan issue and the security dilemma it poses. Despite the improvement in relations between China and the United States since 1979 and the increasing interaction and cooperation across the Pacific, the issue of Taiwan has remained a sour point. While the mainland claims Taiwan as part of China’s territory, the government in Taiwan continues to view itself as an independent state and the sole representative of its citizens. Though Beijing has garnered more international support than Taiwan, continued U.S. support to Taiwan, especially in terms of arms deals, has angered China on more than one occasion. More significantly, China feels that the United States is using Taiwan to indirectly threaten China and force it to take a military stance toward Taiwan at a time when it is trying to peacefully integrate into the world’s economy. As a result, China has played down the Taiwan issue so long as Taiwan does not seek de jure independence, while making great leaps in economic development that can be translated to comprehensive national and military strength, which will be helpful if Taiwan declares independence. China and the United States, therefore, have a very complicated relationship. While the United States is the main source of China’s economic modernization, both have hedged against uncertainty. They have made significant efforts to forge dialogues and promote communication, while each military is still built to deal with each other professionally in the battlefield. Lately there have been an increasing number of skirmishes between the two navies in the South China Sea. The U.S. armed forces feel more need to understand the development of the Chinese navy (the submarine force in particular) while the Chinese army is increasingly assertive in its claim of Chinese rights in its Special Economic Zone. This simply indicates mutual hedging and asks for a mechanism to avoid naval conflict. But given the growing maturity of U.S.—China relations, North Korea may feel more isolated and pressed to accelerate its nuclear weapons program before it becomes a geostrategic liability to China.14 Also, the declining tension across the Taiwan Strait since the Taiwan election in May 2008 has undercut Pyongyang’s chance to secure China’s economic aid unconditionally. In other words, time is running short for North Korea.

**Extinction**

**Hamel-Green and Hayes 10** [Michael, Executive Dean at Victoria, and Peter, Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute, “The Path Not Taken, the Way Still Open: Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia,” 1-5, <http://www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/napsnet/sr/10001HayesHamalGreen.pdf/at_download/file>]

The consequences of failing to address the proliferation threat posed by the North Korea developments, and related political and economic issues, are serious, not only for the Northeast Asian region but for the whole international community. At worst, there is the possibility of nuclear attack, whether by intention, miscalculation, or merely accident, leading to the resumption of Korean War hostilities. On the Korean Peninsula itself, key population centres are well within short or medium range missiles. The whole of Japan is likely to come within North Korean missile range. Pyongyang has a population of over 2 million, Seoul (close to the North Korean border) 11 million, and Tokyo over 20 million. Even a limited nuclear exchange would result in a holocaust of unprecedented proportions. But the catastrophe within the region would not be the only outcome. New research indicates that even a limited nuclear war in the region would rearrange our global climate far more quickly than global warming. Westberg draws attention to new studies modelling the effects of even a limited nuclear exchange involving approximately 100 Hiroshima-sized 15 kt bombs2 (by comparison it should be noted that the United States currently deploys warheads in the range 100 to 477 kt, that is, individual warheads equivalent in yield to a range of 6 to 32 Hiroshimas).The studies indicate that the soot from the fires produced would lead to a decrease in global temperature by 1.25 degrees Celsius for a period of 6-8 years.3 In Westberg’s view: That is not global winter, but the nuclear darkness will cause a deeper drop in temperature than at any time during the last 1000 years. The temperature over the continents would decrease substantially more than the global average. A decrease in rainfall over the continents would also follow...The period of nuclear darkness will cause much greater decrease in grain production than 5% and it will continue for many years...hundreds of millions of people will die from hunger...To make matters even worse, such amounts of smoke injected into the stratosphere would cause a huge reduction in the Earth’s protective ozone. These, of course, are not the only consequences. Reactors might also be targeted, causing further mayhem and downwind radiation effects, superimposed on a smoking, radiating ruin left by nuclear next-use. Millions of refugees would flee the affected regions. The direct impacts, and the follow-on impacts on the global economy via ecological and food insecurity, could make the present global financial crisis pale by comparison. How the great powers, especially the nuclear weapons states respond to such a crisis, and in particular, whether nuclear weapons are used in response to nuclear first-use, could make or break the global non proliferation and disarmament regimes. There could be many unanticipated impacts on regional and global security relationships, with subsequent nuclear breakout and geopolitical turbulence, including possible loss-of-control over fissile material or warheads in the chaos of nuclear war, and aftermath chain-reaction affects involving other potential proliferant states. The Korean nuclear proliferation issue is not just a regional threat but a global one that warrants priority consideration from the international community. Given the high stakes involved, North Korean proliferation, if unaddressed and unreversed, has the potential to destabilize the whole East Asian region and beyond. Even if a nuclear exchange does not occur in the short term, the acute sense of nuclear threat that has been experienced for over five decades by North Koreans as a result of US strategic deterrence is now likely to be keenly felt by fellow Koreans south of the 38th Parallel and Japanese across the waters of the Sea of Japan. China, too, must surely feel itself to be at risk from North Korean nuclear weapons, or from escalation that might ensue from next-use in the Korean Peninsula resulting not only in the environmental consequences noted above, but in regime collapse and massive refugee flows. South Korea and Japan appear willing to rely on their respective bilateral security pacts with the United States to deter North Korean nuclear attack for the time being. However, should South Korea and/or Japan acquire nuclear weapons, the outcome would be destabilizing, especially if this resulted from rupture of their alliance relationships with the United States. Both have the technical capability to do so very rapidly. South Korea has previously engaged in nuclear weapons research but desisted after US pressure. Japan still proclaims its adherence to the three Non-Nuclear Principles although recentconfirmation that the United States routinely transited nuclear weapons through Japan and retains the right of emergency reintroduction of nuclear weapons has tarnished Japan’s non-nuclear image. Moreover, it has large stockpiles of plutonium that could rapidly be used to produce nuclear warheads. Such responses, already advocated by conservative and nationalist groups within South Korea and Japan, could trigger a regional nuclear arms race involving the Koreas, Japan, Taiwan, and China, with incalculable wider consequences for Southeast Asia, South Asia and the whole Pacific and beyond. These developments would spell the demise of the current global non- proliferation regime as underpinned by the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Failure to reverse the DPRK’s nuclear breakout is also an important factor driving a general malaise in the exercise of American power which one of the authors has characterized elsewhere as “the end of American nuclear hegemony.”

**US-China relations trade off with US-India relations**

**Kapila 11** (Subhash, International relations and strategic affairs analyst with a Ph.D in Strategic Studies, South Asia Analysis Group, “CHINA-INDIA-UNITED STATES TRILATERAL: A FLAWED FORMULATION”, November 15th, http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers48%5 Cpaper4772.html, 7/13/12)

Perceptively, what came across in the US Secretary of State assertions were that major calls were being made by the United States on India that it should not only Look East but also Engage East and that India’s leadership would help shape the future of not only South Asia and Central Asia but also that of the Asia Pacific. Contrastingly no calls were made by the US Secretary of State on China to show and prove by demonstrated performance that it will emerge as a responsible stakeholder in Asian security and stability before it can be considered by the United States as a responsible partner in Asian security management. American emphasis seemed more like abject American pleadings that China should appreciate that the United States was sincere in establishing a positive and constructive relationship with China. India already stands engaged in the East by strengthening security relationships with Japan, South Korea, Vietnam and Indonesia, initiatives convergent with United States security architecture in Asia Pacific. What more is United States expecting out of India? The United States so far has not clearly enunciated what it expects of India strategically in relation to China. If the United States expects India to play a leadership role in Asia Pacific then the United States cannot adopt ambivalent postures and strategies on China which confuse India. India adopting an assertive leadership role in Asia Pacific would bring it in a direct and open power tussle with China. Would the United States unambiguously underwrite such a strategy and also the implications that go with it? Washington cannot strategically afford to send different strategic messages to Beijing and different messages or signaling to other Asian capitals of American strategic perceptions and future intentions. In the instant Trilateral formulation espoused by US Secretary of State one gets a feeling that the United States expects India to sink its differences with China, ignore China’s strategic encirclement of India and accede to Chinese demands on the boundary issue so that the United States preferred China-India-United States Trilateral formulation becomes a reality. Or is there a different message which presently seems unfathomable? India has also to note that implicit in the Trilateral formulation espoused by the US Secretary of State is a message for the future and that is that India should let the Russia-India Strategic Partnership fade away and opt for the American preferred China-India-United States Trilateral, Can India afford to do so? Concluding Observations The China-India-United States Trilateral formulation espoused by the US Secretary of State may be a visionary one and should be left at just that. It is an idea whose time has not yet come and unlikely to come in the 21st Century. In terms of political and geostrategic dynamics in Asia even the very thought of China, India and the United States working and cooperating together towards Asian security and stability is unthinkable. The United States Secretary of State seems to be oblivious to the reality that the pressing issues that need resolution in the 21st Century are the creation of China and therefore China cannot be part of the solution. China is the major part of the problem. The United States seems to take India for granted when it espouses and pressurizes the Indian pliable political leadership to appease the Pakistan Army and now attempts a repetition that India should now appease China for the greater good of United States strategic interests in Asia conveniently forgetting that Pakistan and China, singly and jointly, figure heavily as military threats to India’s external and internal security.

**Strong India relations solve inevitable Asian war – litany of reasons**

Richard L. **Armitage et al 10**, Deputy Secretary of State from March 2001 to February 2005, “Natural Allies”, October, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS\_Natural%20Allies\_ArmitageBurnsFontaine.pdf

The U.S. relationship with India should be rooted in shared interests and values and should not be simply transactional or limited to occasional collaboration. India’s rise to global power is**,** we believe,in America’s strategic interest. As a result, the United States should not only seek a closer relationship with India, but actively assist its further emergence as a great power. U.S. interests in a closer relationship with India include: Ensuring a stable Asian and global balance of power. • Strengthening an open global trading system. • Protecting and preserving access to the global commons (air, sea, space, and cyber realms). • Countering terrorism and violent extremism. • Ensuring access to secure global energy resources. • Bolstering the international nonproliferation regime. • Promoting democracy and human rights. • Fostering greater stability, security and economic prosperity in South Asia, including in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. A strong U.S.-India strategic partnership will prove indispensable to the region’s continued peace and prosperity. Both India and the United States have a vital interest in maintaining a stable balance of power in Asia. Neither seeks containment of China, but the likelihood of a peaceful Chinese rise increases if it ascends in a region where the great democratic powers are also strong. Growing U.S.-India strategic ties will ensure that Asia will not have a vacuum of power and will make it easier for both Washington and New Delhi to have productive relations with Beijing. In addition, a strengthened relationship with India, a natural democratic partner, will signal that the United States remains committed to a strong and enduring presence in Asia. The need for closer U.S.-India cooperation goes well beyond regional concerns. In light of its rise, India will play an increasingly vital role in addressing virtually all major global challenges. Now is the time to transform a series of bilateral achievements into a lasting regional and global partnership.

# 2NC

## China Defense

**More evidence – Beijing will do what it wants – their impact is a unicorn**

**Blumenthal 11** (Dan, Resident fellow at AEI, Current commissioner and former vice chairman of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, where he directs efforts to monitor, investigate, and provide recommendations on the national security implications of the economic relationship between the two countries. Previously, he was senior director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia in the Secretary of Defense's Office of International Security Affairs and practiced law in New York prior to his government service. At AEI, in addition to his work on the national security implications of U.S.-Sino relations, he coordinates the Tocqueville on China project, which examines the underlying civic culture of post-Mao China. Mr. Blumenthal also contributes to AEI's Asian Outlook series and is a research associate with the National Asia Research Program. 10/3/2011, “The top ten unicorns of China policy”, http://www.aei.org/article/foreign-and-defense-policy/regional/asia/the-top-ten-unicorns-of-china-policy/)

9) We need China's help to solve global problems. This is further down on my list because it is not really a fantastical unicorn. It is true. **What is a fantasy is that China will be helpful**. We do need China to disarm North Korea. They do not want to, and North Korea is now a nuclear power. The same may soon be true with Iran**. The best we can get in our diplomacy with China is to stop Beijing from being less helpful**. It is a fact that the global problems would be easier to manage with Chinese help. **However, China actually contributing to global order is a unicorn**.

**We can’t agree on anything**

**Economy and Segal, 10**

[ Elizabeth Economy is the C.V. Starr senior fellow and director of Asia studies and Adam Segal is the Ira A. Lipman senior fellow for counterterrorism and national security studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, May 24, 2010, “ Time to Defriend China,” Foreign Policy, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/05/24/time_to_defriend_china?page=0,1>]

That hope was short-lived. It has become painfully clear during the first year of Barack Obama's administration that mismatched interests, values, and capabilities make it difficult for Washington and Beijing to work together to address global challenges. China's unwillingness to sit down with the United States and its maneuverings with India, Brazil, and South Africa to undermine a larger agreement at Copenhagen were clear signs that building a special relationship would not be easy. America's approval of arms sales to Taiwan in January and the Dalai Lama's visit with Obama in February returned both sides to old suspicions and sensitivities. But while we now have a more realistic assessment of what the U.S.-China relationship is not, we still lack a positive formulation of what it is -- or should realistically become. Next week's U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED), the annual high-level dialogue on economic and political issues led by Clinton and Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner on the U. S side and Vice Premier Wang Qishan and State Councilor Dai Bingguo on the Chinese, is unlikely to address this lack of a larger framework. In fact it will compound the problem. In the run-up to next week's meetings, U.S. officials have been all over the map in framing the topics for discussion. State Department officials have identified at least 20 issues of strategic importance to discuss in Beijing. The Treasury Department has laid out an equally broad agenda that includes trade and investment barriers, balanced growth, financial reform, and strengthening the international economic and financial architecture. Meanwhile, some White House officials have mentioned specific goals, such as RMB revaluation; others have said the goal is the development of a larger framework to address strategic issues; still others have said they hope that by putting controversial issues like local content requirements on the agenda, they can get the most senior Chinese officials to make decisions on topics that would typically disappear within the bureaucracy. These are all worthy objectives and outcomes, but the lackluster history of similar dialogues suggests there are better ways to spend our time and effort. Past such dialogues have achieved only modest success delivering on specific goals. Yes, it's true that the last S&ED yielded agreements on EcoPartnerships, collaboration on electric vehicle standards, and development of smart grids. Yet such small-scale cooperation and capacity-building have been a staple of U.S. energy and environmental talks for decades. These narrow goals would hardly seem to merit flying more than a dozen U.S. cabinet members and agency heads crossing the Pacific. Let's be realistic: Progress on core U.S. strategic interests largely emanates from outside such talks. For instance, at Copenhagen, China reversed its stance on two core issues related to its climate change negotiation position, establishing voluntary emission reduction targets and offering to move to the back of the line for international funding assistance. Both of these moves, however, were a response to concerns in the developing world, not U.S. pressure. Similarly, Beijing's apparent willingness to rescind the most controversial portions of a proposed government procurement strategy that would have closed off a large portion of the Chinese market to foreign technologies arose from widescale global protest, not simply U.S. objections. And China's recent decision to support the U.S.-led sanctions against Iran depended largely on Russia folding first and leaving China without political cover to maintain its opposition.

China wants a peaceful rise---any threats are just saber rattling---US also deters

Vu Duc ‘13 "Khanh Vu Duc is a Vietnamese-Canadian lawyer who researches on Vietnamese politics, international relations and international law. He is a frequent contributor to Asia Sentinel and BBC Vietnamese Service, "Who's Bluffing Whom in the South China Sea?" www.asiasentinel.com/index.php?option=com\_content&task=view&id=5237&Itemid=171

Nevertheless, **it remains unlikely that any conflict** between China and Japan, Philippines, or Vietnam will **amount to more than saber rattling and harsh words.** Even a "small" police action against the Philippines or Vietnam over the Spratly Islands, however successful for China, would have severe consequences. Any Chinese use of force **would realize the fears of every state** in the region. Moreover, **Beijing's hope for a peaceful rise would be immediately set back, if not ruined**.¶ Presently, tensions are already running high; however, any clear displays of Chinese aggression would simply add fuel to the fire. Countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam would then be able to turn some of their neighbours—previously skeptical, if not cautious, about standing in opposition to China—and convince these states to protest openly. Any goodwill China possessed among some of these countries would evaporate as the Philippines and/or Vietnam make their case. ¶ However, of all the scenarios of a conflict involving China, what can be certain is the potential for an immediate American intervention. While it is questionable that the US would directly intervene in any skirmish between nations, it is likely that Washington would use the conflict as an excuse for deploying a larger, if not more permanent, security force in Asia-Pacific. Although an increased American footprint would not be welcomed by all in the region, **the US would prove to be an appropriate balance against China.**

**No China escalation**

**AP**, 3/9/**’11**

(“China challenges U.S. edge in Asia-Pacific”)

The U.S. Pacific Command has 325,000 personnel, five aircraft-carrier strike groups, 180 ships and nearly 2,000 aircraft. Tens of thousands of forces stay on China's doorstep at long-established bases in South Korea and Japan. **China's defense spending is still dwarfed by the U**nited **S**tates. Even if China really invests twice as much in its military as its official $91.5 billion budget, that would still be only about a quarter of U.S. spending. It has no aircraft carriers and lags the United States in defense technology. Some of its most vaunted recent military advances will take years to reach operation. For example, China test-flew its stealth fighter in January, months earlier than U.S. intelligence expected, but U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates says China will still only have a couple of hundred of these "fifth-generation" jets by 2025. The United States should have 1,500 by then.

**No escalation—EP-3 and Impeccable proves.**

**Womack 11** – Professor of Foreign Affairs @ University of Virginia [Dr. Brantly Womack (PhD in Poli Sci from University of Chicago), “The Spratlys: From Dangerous Ground to Apple of Discord,” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, Volume 33, Number 3, December 2011, pp. 370-387

It is difficult to imagine a Spratly scenario in which a crisis would go beyond a specific incident and threaten the current overall pattern of mixed occupation. Accidents happen, so incidents cannot be ruled out, though the sustained confrontation of two or more militaries are increasingly unlikely. Accidental incidents are likely to lead to a blamestorm, but not to prolonged conflict or to escalation. A premeditated fait accompli against other claimants, as argued earlier, would not accomplish much. The victor (let us assume China) would have alienated the entire region and it would have alarmed the rest of its neighbours and international partners. International cooperation in resource development would be unlikely, and the logistics of transportation, supply and defence would be formidable. If China’s overall foreign policy made a radical change towards aggressive regional hegemony perhaps the Spratlys could become a battleground. But the ramp-up in aggressiveness would take time to develop, Spratly controversies would be derivative rather than the leading element, and there would no longer be a need for a synecdoche of anxiety. The currently foreseeable future is based on a quarter century of broad and peaceful development in which the Spratlys have been a grain of sand.¶ A militarized incident in the South China Sea between China and the United States is more likely, but it is not likely to originate in the Spratlys nor is it likely to escalate. The direct confrontation has been over the definition of innocent passage in the context of freedom of navigation in EEZs, and an incident in the Spratlys is unlikely to generate a restriction of general freedom of navigation since traffic goes around the islands rather than through them. Incidents such as those involving the EP-3 surveillance aircraft incident of April 2001 or the USNS Impeccable hydrographic ship in March 2009 are possible, but these do not relate specifically to the Spratlys and are only indirectly related to Southeast Asia

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. It would be surprising if Southeast Asian states would be happy with an American solution that would consider intelligence operations (by China as well as by the United States) legitimate up to a twelve mile limit. The reverberations from such incidents are likely to be restricted to tit-for-tat responses rather than general escalation. The days of the War of Jenkins’s Ear are long past.35 pg. 381-383

## India OV

**Asian wars go nuclear**

**Landay**, National Security Expert @ Knight Ridder, 3/10/**’2K**

(Jonathan, Knight Ridder, lexis)

Few if any experts think China and Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea, or India and Pakistan are spoiling to fight. But even a minor miscalculation by any of them could destabilize Asia, jolt the global economy and even start a nuclear war. India, Pakistan and China all have nuclear weapons, and North Korea may have a few, too. Asia lacks the kinds of organizations, negotiations and diplomatic relationships that helped keep an uneasy peace for five decades in Cold War Europe. “Nowhere else on Earth are the stakes as high and relationships so fragile,” said Bates Gill, director of northeast Asian policy studies at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank. “We see the convergence of great power interest overlaid with lingering confrontations with no institutionalized security mechanism in place. There are elements for potential disaster.” In an effort to cool the region’s tempers, President Clinton, Defense Secretary William S. Cohen and National Security Adviser Samuel R. Berger all will hopscotch Asia’s capitals this month. For America, the stakes could hardly be higher. There are 100,000 U.S. troops in Asia committed to defending Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, and the United States would instantly become embroiled if Beijing moved against Taiwan or North Korea attacked South Korea. While Washington has no defense commitments to either India or Pakistan, a conflict between the two could end the global taboo against using nuclear weapons and demolish the already shaky international nonproliferation regime. In addition, globalization has made a stable Asia \_ with its massive markets, cheap labor, exports and resources \_ indispensable to the U.S. economy. Numerous U.S. firms and millions of American jobs depend on trade with Asia that totaled $600 billion last year, according to the Commerce Department.

**Barriers fail and tensions are high**

**Dibb**, Professor of Security Studies @ the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, **‘1**

(Paul, <http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0JIW/is_1_54/ai_75762211>)

The areas of maximum danger and instability in the world today are in Asia, followed by the Middle East and parts of the former Soviet Union. The strategic situation in Asia is more uncertain and potentially threatening than anywhere in Europe. Unlike in Europe, it is possible to envisage war in Asia involving the major powers: remnants of Cold War ideological confrontation still exist across the Taiwan Straits and on the Korean Peninsula; India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, and these two countries are more confrontational than at any time since the early 1970s; in Southeast Asia, Indonesia--which is the world's fourth-largest country--faces a highly uncertain future that could lead to its breakup. The Asia-Pacific region spends more on defense (about $150 billion a year) than any other part of the world except the United States and Nato Europe. China and Japan are amongst the top four or five global military spenders. Asia also has more nuclear powers than any other region of the world. Asia's security is at a crossroads: the region could go in the direction of peace and cooperation, or it could slide into confrontation and military conflict. There are positive tendencies, including the resurgence of economic growth and the spread of democracy, which would encourage an optimistic view. But there are a number of negative tendencies that must be of serious concern. There are deep-seated historical, territorial, ideological, and religious differences in Asia. Also, the region has no history of successful multilateral security cooperation or arms control. Such multilateral institutions as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the ASEAN Regional Forum have shown themselves to be ineffective when confronted with major crises.

**Proximity ensures escalation**

**Cimbala 08** Stephen Cimbala, Professor of Political Science at Penn State University, March 2008, “Anticipatory Attacks: Nuclear Crisis Stability in Future Asia,” Comparative Strategy, 27:2, informaworld

The spread of nuclear weapons in Asia presents a complicated mosaic of possibilities in this regard. States with nuclear forces of variable force structure, operational experience, and command-control systems will be thrown into a matrix of complex political, social, and cultural crosscurrents contributory to the possibility of war. In addition to the existing nuclear powers in Asia, others may seek nuclear weapons if they feel threatened by regional rivals or hostile alliances. Containment of nuclear proliferation in Asia is a desirable political objective for all of the obvious reasons. Nevertheless, the present century is unlikely to see the nuclear hesitancy or risk aversion that marked the ColdWar, in part, because the military and political discipline imposed by the Cold War superpowers no longer exists, but also because states in Asia have new aspirations for regional or global respect.12 The spread of ballistic missiles and other nuclear-capable delivery systems in Asia, or in the Middle East with reach into Asia, is especially dangerous because plausible adversaries live close together and are already engaged in ongoing disputes about territory or other issues.13 The Cold War Americans and Soviets required missiles and airborne delivery systems of intercontinental range to strike at one another’s vitals. But short-range ballistic missiles or fighter-bombers suffice for India and Pakistan to launch attacks at one another with potentially “strategic” effects. China shares borders with Russia, North Korea, India, and Pakistan; Russia, with China and NorthKorea; India, with Pakistan and China; Pakistan, with India and China; and so on. The short flight times of ballistic missiles between the cities or military forces of contiguous states means that very little time will be available for warning and attack assessment by the defender. Conventionally armed missiles could easily be mistaken for a tactical nuclear first use. Fighter-bombers appearing over the horizon could just as easily be carrying nuclear weapons as conventional ordnance. In addition to the challenges posed by shorter flight times and uncertain weapons loads, potential victims of nuclear attack in Asia may Downloaded By: [University of California Berkley] At: 02:27 21 September 2009 Nuclear Crisis Stability in Future Asia 121 also have first strike–vulnerable forces and command-control systems that increase decision pressures for rapid, and possibly mistaken, retaliation. This potpourri of possibilities challenges conventional wisdom about nuclear deterrence and proliferation on the part of policymakers and academic theorists. For policymakers in the United States and NATO, spreading nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in Asia could profoundly shift the geopolitics of mass destruction from a European center of gravity (in the twentieth century) to an Asian and/or Middle Eastern center of gravity (in the present century).14 This would profoundly shake up prognostications to the effect that wars of mass destruction are now passe, on account of the emergence of the “Revolution in Military Affairs” and its encouragement of information-based warfare.15 Together with this, there has emerged the argument that large-scale war between states or coalitions of states, as opposed to varieties of unconventional warfare and failed states, are exceptional and potentially obsolete.16 The spread of WMD and ballistic missiles in Asia could overturn these expectations for the obsolescence or marginalization of major interstate warfare.

## Central Asia Impact

**Indian relations key to central asian stability**

**Gupta 5**, Visiting Professor in the Department of Strategy and International Security at the U.S. Air War College, (Amit, “ THE U.S.-INDIA RELATIONSHIP: STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP OR COMPLEMENTARY INTERESTS?” February, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub596.pdf>)

The other area where Indian military capability could be harnessed to facilitate American interests is in Central Asia. Indian interests there are driven by three factors: the need for energy resources and the potential of the Central Asian market; the attempt to counterbalance Chinese and Pakistani presence in the region; and the concern about radical Islam spreading from the region into India (especially Kashmir).65 India viewed with concern the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan and the subsequent destabilization of the region caused by that fundamentalist regime. It provided support to the Northern Alliance and, with the Taliban’s ouster, has sought to develop a presence in Central Asia. India has increased its cooperation with the Central Asian states, particularly Tajikistan, where it has reportedly established an air base.66 Such a base would not only permit military action against anti-government forces in Central Asia, but also serve to counter Pakistan’s efforts to establish “defense in depth” in the region. Like India, the Central Asian states are concerned about the growth of radical Islam and the threat it poses to their regimes that, because they are post-Soviet in orientation, tend to be secular. It has also actively engaged the Karzai government and established a major diplomatic presence in Afghan cities and has reached an agreement to train the Afghan national army.67 Like most regional countries, India would like to prevent the reemergence of radical Islamic groups in Central Asia and therefore would be willing to help build the indigenous security capabilities of these countries. For a United States strapped for manpower, Indian security assistance especially would be welcome since it would further Washington’s own goal of checking radical Islam in the region―thereby freeing U.S. troops for action in other theaters in the war against terror. In terms of energy and economics, India would like to play a growing role in Central Asia both to check the role of China and Pakistan but also to satisfy its own developmental needs. By 2010, Indian demand for natural gas may be as high as 77 billion cubic meters, and a steady supply of gas from the resource rich Central Asian countries would satisfy this demand.68 India, with Russia and Iran, is engaged, therefore, in the development of a NorthSouth corridor (one that passes from Mumbai to Tehran and from there to St. Petersburg) that would, among other things, open the Central Asian economies to the outside world.69 India’s stakes in Central Asia are, therefore, expanding, and we are seeing a series of complementary U.S. interests emerge. For both countries, checking the rise of radical Islam in the region is important. The opening of the Central Asian economies, in which India is participating, will reduce these countries’ crippling dependence on the other former Soviet states, particularly Russia. And if India is able to help bring Iran back into the international community of nations, it will create a safer energy corridor than the one currently proposed to run through Afghanistan and Pakistan. As mentioned earlier, a growth in security cooperation between the United States and India would rest on the removal of constraints on Indian military and technological development, as well as an appreciation of India’s emerging power potential. This, however, is likely to be a long-term process and one marked with several speed bumps as the American war against terror and the global policies of nonproliferation work to limit what can be achieved in IndoU.S. relations. Given these limitations, it is important that India, in the short-to-medium term, look for other avenues for successfully engaging the United States. Two such avenues are that both the United States and India share democratic values, and the other is to look at nonmilitary approaches to engagement. Both these avenues intersect in the growth of India’s soft power.

**Extinction**

**Blank 2k** [Stephen J. - Expert on the Soviet Bloc for the Strategic Studies Institute, “American Grand Strategy and the Transcaspian Region”, World Affairs. 9-22]

Thus many structural conditions for conventional war or protracted ethnic conflict where third parties intervene now exist in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia. The outbreak of violence by disaffected Islamic elements, the drug trade, the Chechen wars, and the unresolved ethnopolitical conflicts that dot the region, not to mention the undemocratic and unbalanced distribution of income across corrupt governments, provide plenty of tinder for future fires. Many Third World conflicts generated by local structural factors also have great potential for unintended escalation. Big powers often feel obliged to rescue their proxies and proteges. One or another big power may fail to grasp the stakes for the other side since interests here are not as clear as in Europe. Hence commitments involving the use of nuclear weapons or perhaps even conventional war to prevent defeat of a client are not well established or clear as in Europe. For instance, in 1993 Turkish noises about intervening on behalf of Azerbaijan induced Russian leaders to threaten a nuclear war in that case. Precisely because Turkey is a NATO ally but probably could not prevail in a long war against Russia, or if it could, would conceivably trigger a potential nuclear blow (not a small possibility given the erratic nature of Russia's declared nuclear strategies), the danger of major war is higher here than almost everywhere else in the CIS or the "arc of crisis" from the Balkans to China. As Richard Betts has observed, The greatest danger lies in areas where (1) the potential for serious instability is high; (2) both superpowers perceive vital interests; (3) neither recognizes that the other's perceived interest or commitment is as great as its own; (4) both have the capability to inject conventional forces; and (5) neither has willing proxies capable of settling the situation.(77)

## Indopak Impact

**Relations key to check any Indo-Pak conflict**

**Dugger 02** [Celia W., June 10, “Wider Military Ties With India Offer U.S. Diplomatic Leverage,” New York Times, last accessed 7/8/11, <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/10/world/wider-military-ties-with-india-offer-us-diplomatic-leverage.html>]

Military cooperation between India and the United States has remarkably quickened since Sept. 11, with a burst of navy, air force and army joint exercises, the revival of American military sales to India and a blur of high-level visits by generals and admirals. The fledgling relationship between American and Indian military leaders will be important to Mr. Rumsfeld in talks intended to put to rest fears of war between India and Pakistan. ''We can hope this translates into some influence and trust, though I don't want to overstate it,'' a senior American defense official said in an interview on Thursday. ''I don't want to predict this guarantees success.'' The American diplomatic efforts yielded their first real gains on Saturday when India welcomed a pledge by Pakistan's military ruler to stop permanently the infiltration of militants into Kashmir. India indicated that it would soon take steps to reduce tensions, but a million troops are still fully mobilized along the border -- a situation likely to persist for months -- and the process of resolving the crisis has just begun. India has linked the killing of civilians in Kashmir to a Pakistan-backed insurgency there and has presented its confrontation with Pakistan as part of the global campaign against terrorism. India itself made an unstinting offer of support to the United States after Sept. 11, and Washington responded by ending the sanctions placed on India after its 1998 nuclear tests. With that, the estrangement that prevailed between the world's two largest democracies during the cold war, when India drew close to the Soviet Union and the United States allied with Pakistan, has eased. India, for decades a champion of nonalignment, seeks warmer ties with the United States in hopes of gaining access to sophisticated military technology and help in dealing with Pakistan. From the start of President Bush's term, some influential officials in his administration saw India as a potential counterweight to that other Asian behemoth, China, whose growing power was seen as a potential strategic threat.

**Extinction**

**Robock and Toon 10** - Dr. Alan Robock is a professor of climatology in the Department of Environmental Sciences at Rutgers University and the associate director of its Center for Environmental Prediction. Prof. Robock has been a researcher in the area of climate change for more than 30 years. His current research focuses on soil moisture variations, the effects of volcanic eruptions on climate, effects of nuclear war on climate, and regional atmosphere/hydrology modeling. He has served as Editor of climate journals, including the Journal of Climate and Applied Meteorology and the Journal of Geophysical Research-Atmospheres. He has published more than 250 articles on his research, including more than 150 peer-reviewed papers and Owen Brian Toon is professor of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences and a fellow at the Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics (LASP) at the University of Colorado, received his Ph.D. from Cornell University – From the January 20 10 Scientific American Magazine –http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/RobockToonSciAmJan2010.pdf)

By deploying modern computers and modern cli­mate models, the two of us and our colleagues have shown that not only were the ideas of the 1980s correct but the effects would last for at least 10 years, much longer than previously thought. And by doing calculations that assess decades of time, only now possible with fast, current computers, and by including in our cal­culations the oceans and the entire atmosphere— also only now possible—we have found that the smoke from even a regional war would be heat­ed and lofted by the sun and remain suspended in the upper atmosphere for years, continuing to block sunlight and to cool the earth. India and Pakistan, which together have more than 100 nuclear weapons, may be the most worrisome adversaries capable of a regional nu­clear conflict today. But other countries besides the U.S. and Russia (which have thousands) are well endowed: China, France and the U.K. have hundreds of nuclear warheads; Israel has more than 80, North Korea has about 10 and Iran may well be trying to make its own. In 2004 this situation prompted one of us (Toon) and later Rich Turco of the University of California, Los Angeles, both veterans of the 1980s investiga­tions, to begin evaluating what the global envi­ronmental effects of a regional nuclear war would be and to take as our test case an engage­ment between India and Pakistan. The latest estimates by David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security and by Robert S. Norris of the Natural Resourc­es Defense Council are that India has 50 to 60 assembled weapons (with enough plutonium for 100) and that Pakistan has 60 weapons. Both countries continue to increase their arsenals. In­dian and Pakistani nuclear weapons tests indi­cate that the yield of the warheads would be sim­ilar to the 15-kiloton explosive yield (equivalent to 15,000 tons of TNT) of the bomb the U.S. used on Hiroshima. Toon and Turco, along with Charles Bardeen, now at the National Center for Atmospheric Re­search, modeled what would happen if 50 Hiro­shima-size bombs were dropped across the high­est population-density targets in Pakistan and if 50 similar bombs were also dropped across In­dia. Some people maintain that nuclear weapons would be used in only a measured way. But in the wake of chaos, fear and broken communications that would occur once a nuclear war began, we doubt leaders would limit attacks in any rational manner. This likelihood is particularly true for Pakistan, which is small and could be quickly overrun in a conventional conflict. Peter R. La­ voy of the Naval Postgraduate School, for exam­ple, has analyzed the ways in which a conflict be­tween India and Pakistan might occur and ar­gues that Pakistan could face a decision to use all its nuclear arsenal quickly before India swamps its military bases with traditional forces. Obviously, we hope the number of nuclear targets in any future war will be zero, but policy makers and voters should know what is possible. Toon and Turco found that more than 20 million people in the two countries could die from the blasts, fires and radioactivity—a horrible slaugh­ter. But the investigators were shocked to discov­er that a tremendous amount of smoke would be generated, given the megacities in the two coun­tries, assuming each fire would burn the same area that actually did burn in Hiroshima and as­suming an amount of burnable material per per­son based on various studies. They calculated that the 50 bombs exploded in Pakistan would produce three teragrams of smoke, and the 50 bombs hitting India would generate four (one teragram equals a million metric tons). Satellite observations of actual forest fires have shown that smoke can be lofted up through the troposphere (the bottom layer of the atmosphere) and sometimes then into the lower stratosphere (the layer just above, extending to about 30 miles). Toon and Turco also did some “back of the en­velope” calculations of the possible climate im­pact of the smoke should it enter the stratosphere. The large magnitude of such effects made them realize they needed help from a climate modeler. It turned out that one of us (Robock) was already working with Luke Oman, now at the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, who was finishing his Ph.D. at Rutgers University on the climatic effects of volcanic eruptions, and with Georgiy L. Stenchikov, also at Rutgers and an author of the first Russian work on nuclear winter. They developed a climate model that could be used fairly easily for the nuclear blast calculations. Robock and his colleagues, being conserva­tive, put five teragrams of smoke into their mod­eled upper troposphere over India and Pakistan on an imaginary May 15. The model calculated how winds would blow the smoke around the world and how the smoke particles would settle out from the atmosphere. The smoke covered all the continents within two weeks. The black, sooty smoke absorbed sunlight, warmed and rose into the stratosphere. Rain never falls there, so the air is never cleansed by precipitation; par­ticles very slowly settle out by falling, with air resisting them. Soot particles are small, with an average diameter of only 0.1 micron (μm), and so drift down very slowly. They also rise during the daytime as they are heated by the sun, re­peatedly delaying their elimination. The calcu­lations showed that the smoke would reach far higher into the upper stratosphere than the sul­fate particles that are produced by episodic vol­canic eruptions. Sulfate particles are transparent and absorb much less sunlight than soot and are also bigger, typically 0.5 μm. The volcanic par­ticles remain airborne for about two years, but smoke from nuclear fires would last a decade. Killing Frosts in Summer The climatic response to the smoke was surpris­ing. Sunlight was immediately reduced, cooling the planet to temperatures lower than any expe­rienced for the past 1,000 years. The global aver­age cooling, of about 1.25 degrees Celsius (2.3 degrees Fahrenheit), lasted for several years, and even after 10 years the temperature was still 0.5 degree C colder than normal. The models also showed a 10 percent reduction in precipitation worldwide. Precipitation, river flow and soil moisture all decreased because blocking sun­light reduces evaporation and weakens the hydrologic cycle. Drought was largely concen­trated in the lower latitudes, however, because global cooling would retard the Hadley air cir­culation pattern in the tropics, which produces a large fraction of global precipitation. In criti­cal areas such as the Asian monsoon regions, rainfall dropped by as much as 40 percent. The cooling might not seem like much, but even a small dip can cause severe consequences. Cooling and diminished sunlight would, for ex­ample, shorten growing seasons in the midlati­tudes. More insight into the effects of cooling came from analyses of the aftermaths of massive volcanic eruptions. Every once in a while such eruptions produce temporary cooling for a year or two. The largest of the past 500 years, the 1815 Tambora eruption in Indonesia, blotted the sun and produced global cooling of about 0.5 de­gree C for a year; 1816 became known as “The Year without a Summer” or “Eighteen Hundred and Froze to Death.” In New England, although the average summer temperature was lowered only a few degrees, crop-killing frosts occurred in every month. After the first frost, farmers re­planted crops, only to see them killed by the next frost. The price of grain skyrocketed, the price of livestock plummeted as farmers sold the animals they could not feed, and a mass migration began from New England to the Midwest, as people fol­lowed reports of fertile land there. In Europe the weather was so cold and gloomy that the stock market collapsed, widespread famines occurred and 18-year-old Mary Shelley was inspired to write *Frankenstein.* Certain strains of crops, such as winter wheat, can withstand lower temperatures, but a lack of sunlight inhibits their ability to grow. In our scenario, daylight would filter through the high smoky haze, but on the ground every day would seem to be fully overcast. Agronomists and farmers could not develop the necessaryseeds or adjust agricultural practices for the rad­ically different conditions unless they knew ahead of time what to expect. In addition to the cooling, drying and dark­ness, extensive ozone depletion would result as the smoke heated the stratosphere; reactions that create and destroy ozone are temperature-depen­dent. Michael J. Mills of the University of Colo­rado at Boulder ran a completely separate climate model from Robock’s but found similar results for smoke lofting and stratospheric temperature changes. He concluded that although surface temperatures would cool by a small amount, the stratosphere would be heated by more than 50 degrees C, because the black smoke particles ab­sorb sunlight. This heating, in turn, would mod­ify winds in the stratosphere, which would carry ozone-destroying nitrogen oxides into its upper reaches. Together the high temperatures and ni­trogen oxides would reduce ozone to the same dangerous levels we now experience below the ozone hole above Antarctica every spring. Ultra­violet radiation on the ground would increase significantly because of the diminished ozone. Less sunlight and precipitation, cold spells, shorter growing seasons and more ultraviolet ra­diation would all reduce or eliminate agricultur­al production. Notably, cooling and ozone loss would be most profound in middle and high lat­itudes in both hemispheres, whereas precipita­tion declines would be greatest in the tropics. The specific damage inflicted by each of these environmental changes would depend on partic­ular crops, soils, agricultural practices and re­gional weather patterns, and no researchers have completed detailed analyses of such agricultural responses. Even in normal times, however, feed­ing the growing human population depends on transferring food across the globe to make up for regional farming deficiencies caused by drought and seasonal weather changes. The total amount of grain stored on the planet today would feed the earth’s population for only about two months [see “Could Food Shortages Bring Down Civiliza­tion?” by Lester R. Brown; Scientific Ameri­can, May]. Most cities and countries have stock­piled food supplies for just a very short period, and food shortages (as well as rising prices) have increased in recent years. A nuclear war could trigger declines in yield nearly everywhere at once, and a worldwide panic could bring the glob­al agricultural trading system to a halt, with se­vere shortages in many places. Around one billion people worldwide who now live on marginal food supplies would be directly threatened with star­vation by a nuclear war between India and Paki­stan or between other regional nuclear powers. Independent Evidence Needed Typically scientists test models and theories by doing experiments, but we obviously cannot experiment in this case. Thus, we look for ana­logues that can verify our models. Burned cities. Unfortunately, firestorms cre­ated by intense releases of energy have pumped vast quantities of smoke into the upper atmo­sphere. San Francisco burned as a result of the 1906 earthquake, and whole cities were incin­erated during World War II, including Dresden, Hamburg, Tokyo, Hiroshima and Nagasaki. These events confirm that smoke from intense urban fires rises into the upper atmosphere. The seasonal cycle. In actual winter the cli­mate is cooler because the days are shorter and sunlight is less intense; the simple change of sea­sons helps us quantify the effects of less solar ra­diation. Our climate models re-create the sea­sonal cycle well, confirming that they properly reflect changes in sunlight. Eruptions. Explosive volcanic eruptions, such as those of Tambora in 1815, Krakatau in 1883 and Pinatubo in 1991 provide several lessons. The resulting sulfate aerosol clouds that formed in the stratosphere were transported around the world by winds. The surface temperature plum­meted after each eruption in proportion to the thickness of the particulate cloud. After the Pi­natubo eruption, the global average surface tem­perature dropped by about 0.25 degree C. Glob­al precipitation, river flow and soil moisture all decreased. Our models reproduce these effects. Forest fires. Smoke from large forest fires sometimes is injected into the troposphere and lower stratosphere and is transported great dis­tances, producing cooling. Our models perform well against these effects, too. Extinction of the dinosaurs**.**An asteroid smashed into Mexico’s Yucatán Peninsula 65 million years ago. The resulting dust cloud, mixed with smoke from fires, blocked the Sun, killing the dinosaurs. Massive volcanism in India at the same time may have exacerbated the ef­fects. The events teach us that large amounts of aerosols in the earth’s atmosphere can change climate drastically enough to kill robust species.

## Trade

**Won’t cause military conflict**

Bradford 9 (Anu, Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Chicago Law School, Future of the WTO, http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2009/02/future-of-the-wto-governing-the-world-economy-beyond-trade.html)

Acknowledging this shift towards regionalism, Richard asks: “Will we see competition between blocs? Cooperation between them? What will be the implications for multilateralism?” China’s recent effort to build closer trade relations with its Asian neighbors is one of the most interesting developments. That trend is likely to continue. Greg seems correct in doubting the emergence of coherent rival geopolitical blocks. But the most important regional trade deals will be built around the US, EU and China. In addition, we will see a fragmented web of PTAs within, across and beyond the key trade regions. I would predict some competition but no confrontation among regional blocks. We may see attempts of the “big three” – the US, EU and China – to expand their spheres of economic influence though negotiating PTAs with other states, in particular the energy-rich states in the Middle East, Central Asia and Africa.

# 1NR

## A2: WM

They are appeasement which is distinct – our definition is the most precise

Resnick 1 – Dr. Evan Resnick, Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University, “Defining Engagement”, Journal of International Affairs, Spring, 54(2), Ebsco

A more refined definition of appeasement that not only remains loyal to the traditional connotations but also establishes a firm conceptual distinction from engagement might be: the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state by ceding territory and/or a geopolitical sphere of influence to that state. Indeed, the two best-known cases of appeasement, Great Britain's appeasement of the United States at the turn of the 20th century and of Nazi Germany in the 1930s, reveals that much of this appeasement adopted precisely these guises. The key elements of the British appeasement of the US-acceptance of the Monroe Doctrine-permission for the US to build and fortify a Central American canal, and acquiescence to American claims on the border between Alaska and the Yukon--consisted of explicit acknowledgement of American territorial authority.(n32) Meanwhile, the appeasement of the Third Reich by Great Britain was characterized by acquiescence to: Germany's military reoccupation of the Rhineland (1936); annexation of Austria (1938); acquisition of the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia as decided at the Munich Conference; and absorption of the remainder of Czechoslovakia (1939).(n33) A more contemporary example of appeasement is the land for peace exchange that represents the centerpiece of the on-again off-again diplomatic negotiations between the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority.

Even if they win they are “economic”, they are negotiation in an economic forum which is economic negotiation – explodes limits

Odell 00 – John S. Odell, Professor of International Relations at the University of Southern California, Negotiating the World Economy, p. 11

Economic negotiations are those in which parties' demands, offers, and related actions refer to the production, movement or exchange of goods, services, investments (including official development loans), money, information, or their regulation. This book concentrates on trade and finance, but economic bargaining includes other issues such as transportation, communication, and investment. All such episodes share a crucial property that is absent from typical security negotiations: they are sensitive to concrete markets. This market sensitivity is found in many cases that are otherwise diverse. Economic episodes are important enough and distinctive enough for study and yet they have not been viewed together in this light.

Increase means to become larger or greater in quantity

Encarta 6 – Encarta Online Dictionary. 2006. ("Increase" http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/features/dictionary/DictionaryResults.aspx?refid=1861620741)

in·crease [ in krss ]  
transitive and intransitive verb  (*past and past participle* in·creased, *present participle* in·creas·ing, *3rd person present singular* in·creas·es)Definition**:**make or become larger or greater: to become, or make something become, larger in number, quantity, or degree  
noun  (*plural* in·creas·es)

Allowing effects topicality is a limits disaster on this topic – everything the US does effects the international economy

Derrick, 98 - Lieutenant Colonel Robert R. Derrick United States Army (“Engagement: The Nations Premier Grand Strategy, Who's in Charge?” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA342695)

In addition to the agencies that administer the programs listed in figure 3, the State Department proclaims that "...protecting national interests and advancing US goals involve virtually every agency of the government...."16 US governmental agencies with international reach directly engage as a part of their daily routines. Agencies that deal strictly with domestic policy indirectly engage through the effect their actions have on US markets and thus world markets. For example the Departments of State, Defense, Agriculture, Transportation, and Energy, have both domestic and international responsibilities. From trade status to travel status, from immigration rules to export of tools, from training flights to basing rights, US agencies directly and indirectly engage through hundreds of programs. US governmental agencies that inadvertently operate at crosspurposes, through misunderstanding or ignorance, must ultimately be coordinated at some point. Since there is no single director below the President to coordinate the US engagement activities of the three elements of national power, it becomes the responsibility of the regional CINCs and Ambassadors.

## A2: CI

We have a comparative definition – excising negotiations from the topic is key to precision – only a definition that focuses on solely economics is valuable

Dueck 6 (Colin, assistant professor of political science at the University of Colorado, Boulder, and the author of Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture and Change in American Grand Strategy, “Strategies for Managing Rogue States,” Orbis Volume 50, Issue 2, Spring 2006, Pages 223–241, )

Engagement, a popular concept in recent years, actually has several possible meanings and is used in a number of different ways. It can refer to (1) a stance of diplomatic or commercial activism internationally;8 (2) the simple fact of ongoing political or economic contact with an existing counterpart or adversary; (3) using such political or economic contact as a strategy in itself, in the hopes that this contact will create patterns of cooperation, integration, and interdependence with a rogue state;9 (4) a strategy under which international adversaries enter into a limited range of cooperative agreements, alongside continued rivalry or competition;10 or (5) the very act of diplomacy, negotiating, or bargaining, regardless of its content. Only the third definition, focusing on integration through contact, is analytically useful. The first is too vague to be of much use; the second is a condition rather than a strategy; the fourth is more accurately captured by détente; and as to the last definition, there is no compelling reason to abandon the words “diplomacy,” “negotiating,” or “bargaining” when they have served very well up to now.11

## A2: Reasonability

Reasonability is impossible—it undermines decision-making, research and preparation

Resnick, 1 – assistant professor of political science – Yeshiva University (Evan, “Defining Engagement,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, Iss. 2)

In matters of national security, establishing a clear definition of terms is a precondition for effective policymaking. Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an erratic, ad hoc fashion risk alienating their constituencies. They also risk exacerbating misperceptions and hostility among those the policies target. Scholars who commit the same error undercut their ability to conduct valuable empirical research. Hence, if scholars and policymakers fail rigorously to define "engagement," they undermine the ability to build an effective foreign policy.